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SEPARATION, DEPORTATION, TERMINATION
MARCIA YABLON-ZUG*
Abstract: There is a growing practice of separating immigrant children
from their deportable parents. Parental fitness is no longer the standard
with regard to undocumented immigrant parents. Increasingly, fit un-
documented parents must convince courts and welfare agencies that
continuing or resuming parental custody is in their child's best interest.
This requirement is unique to immigrant parents and can have a disas-
trous impact on their ability to retain custody of their children. Best in-
terest decisions are highly subjective and courts and agencies increas-
ingly base their custody determinations on subjective criteria such as
negative perceptions regarding undocumented immigrants and their
countries of origin, and on extremely positive beliefs regarding the
benefits of an American upbringing. For undocumented parents facing
deportation, this is a disastrous combination. Courts and agencies fre-
quently conclude that allowing a child to leave with a deported parent,
return to a foreign country, and forgo childhood in the United States is
not in the child's best interest. Replacing the parental rights standard
with a best interest of the child standard in the context of undocu-
mented immigrant families is the latest example of the increasing power
of the children's rights movement. This, however, is a drastic change
and one that must receive considerable attention and consideration be-
fore it is permitted to continue.
INTRODUCTION
On a Tuesday afternoon in late September of 2009, Maria Gurrolla
was caring for her newborn son.' She had just returned home from
running errands when a black police style sedan pulled up in front of
@ 2012, Marcia Yablon-Zug.
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thank Professors Annette Appell, Washington University School of Law, Elizabeth Bartholet,
Harvard Law School; Danielle Holley-Walker, University of South Carolina School of Law,
Solangel Maldonado, Seton Hall University School of Law, Isabel Median, Loyola University
New Orleans College of Law, Hiroshi Motomura, UCLA School of Law; Angela Onwuachi-
Willig, University of Iowa College of Law; David Thronson, Michigan State University College
of Law, Rose Cuison Villazor, Hofstra University School of Law, and Charles Yablon, Benja-
min N. Cardozo School of Law for their invaluable assistance with this Article.
I See Gabriel Falcon, Update: Amber Alert for Abducted Neuborn, ANDERSON COOPER 360'
CNN BLOG, (Sept. 30, 2009, 10:37 AM), http://ac360.blogs.cnn.com/2009/09/30/update-
amber-alert-for-abducted-newborn.
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her house. A blonde woman exited the car and knocked on Gurrolla's
door. The woman falsely identified herself as an immigration official
and then demanded Gurrolla's baby. When Gurrolla refused, the
woman stabbed her eight times and abducted her child.2
Gurrolla survived, and shortly after the abduction police located
the woman and returned the baby.3 Just moments after being reunited
with his mother, however, the state took the baby and his siblings into
custody based on allegations that a family member had attempted to sell
the child.4 The allegations were unfounded, and eventually, the family
reunited.5
Maria Gurrolla's son was taken twice, first by a kidnapper and then
by the state.6 Perhaps more than anything else, it is the combination of
2 See id.; Kristin M. Hall & Desiree Hunter, Kidnapped Baby Found: State Reunites Mother
and Child, Then Takes Custody ff Kids, HUFFINGTON PosT (Oct. 4, 2009, 2:58 AM), http://
www.huffmgtonpost.com/2009/10/04/kidnapped-baby-found-stat-n_308936.html.
Baby Snatch Victim Loses Kids to State Custody, FOX NEWS, (Oct. 4, 2009), http://www.
foxnews.com/us/2009/10/04/baby-snatch-victim-loses-kids-state-custody.
Chris Echegaray & Kate Howard, Reunited: Baby Is Home; Parents Are in the Clear, TEN-
NESSEAN, Oct. 7, 2009, at 1A. The public perception of Hispanic-and particularly un-
documented Hispanic-immigrants as bad parents is an issue discussed in Part V below. See
infra notes 329-349.
5 Echegaray & Howard, supra note 4. State officials, however, were so inclined to be-
lieve the allegations that they were willing to order state placement over placement with
relatives, adding to the trauma experienced by these children. See Travis Loller, Relatives
Question Why Officials Took Tenn. Baby, SEATTLE TIMES (Oct. 8, 2009), http://seatletimes.nw
source.com/html/nationworld/2010025222_apustennbabysnatched.html. Maria's three-
year old daughter, who had witnessed her mother's stabbing, found this separation espe-
cially traumatic; her trauma resulted in an illness that required hospitalization. Id. In addi-
tion, even after reunification, the investigation of the child trafficking allegations contin-
ued as police interviewed other family members. See Echegaray & Howard, supra note 4.
6 See Loller, supra note 5. Gurrolla's case is not unique. According to Cathy Nahirny, a
senior analyst with the National Center for Missing & Exploited Children, "there have
been at least two other recent cases where an abductor used a ploy similar to the one used
in this case." Hall & Hunter, supra note 2; see also E-Mail from Monzer Mansour, Attorney at
Law, to author (Aug. 5, 2009, 11:37 AM) (on file with author) ("I litigated a case almost
two years ago where my client, here illegally, was defrauded and intimidated by a childless
couple into consenting to a permanent guardianship of my client's infant with no contact
permitted between the child and the natural mother. The invidious goal was to eventually
adopt the baby. After a one day trial, the judge thankfully decided in favor of my client and
ordered the return of her baby after about a year or more of separation."); Rich Phillips,
Florida Parents Reunited with Baby Taken for 6 Months, CNN JusT. (Feb. 3, 2010), http://
articles.cnn.com/2010-02-03/justice/florida.baby.returned-lparents-child-florida-couple?
s=PM:CRIME (describing the abduction of an undocumented immigrant couple's child
by a woman who "'used threats and intimidation against the parents to have control and
access to the child. She threatened to deport them and report them to DCF (the Florida
Department of Children and Families) to try and control them . .. .'"). "'We need to get
the word out to our immigrant communities,' Nahirny said .... [I] mmigrant families have
64 [Vol. 32:63
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these events that demonstrate the unique vulnerabilities of undocu-
mented irmnigrant families like Gurrolla's. If the issue were sympathies,
it would be hard to find a more sympathetic mother than Gurrolla; she
nearly lost her life attempting to protect her son.7 Nevertheless, when
the state received information regarding the potential, although
unlikely and unsupported, threat of harm to Gurrolla's child, her sacri-
fices for her son were irrelevant and the harm that such removal could
cause Gurrolla was immaterial.8 The state needed only a single accusa-
tion to question Gurrolla's parental fitness and order the removal of
her children.9
Gurrolla's case raises two serious concerns. The first is the state's
decision to focus on what it perceived to be her children's best interests
rather than Gurrolla's parental rights. The second is that Gurrolla's un-
documented status appears to have increased the likelihood of having
her parental fitness called into question. The Gurrolla case is troubling
and, even if it were an isolated incident, the concerns it raises would still
be worthy of discussion. The Gurrolla case, however, is not unique.10
More than two dozen similar incidents have occurred across the United
States, revealing that certain modes of reasoning and argument can ef-
been targets of child abductions because of the assumption they will not tell police." Hall
& Hunter, supra note 2.
7 See Echegaray & Howard, supra note 4.
8 See Loller, supra note 5.
9 See Echegaray & Howard, supra note 4; Loller, supra note 5.
10 See Ginger Thompson, After Losing Freedom, Some Immigrants Face Loss of Custody of Their
Children, N.Y TIMES, Apr. 23, 2009, at A15 (addressing the story of Encarnaci6n Bail Romero
and her son Carlos, stating that "lawyers and advocates for immigrants say that cases like his
are popping up across the country as crackdowns against illegal immigrants thrust local
courts into transnational custody battles and leave thousands of children in limbo"); Tele-
phone Interview with Chris Huck, lawyer for Bail Romero and Maria Luis, DLA Piper (Aug.
13, 2009) (stating that he knew of maybe 12 cases from Nebraska alone, but noting that such
cases are "rarely appealed"); see also Nina Rabin, Disappearing Parents: Immigration Euforcement
and the Child Welfare System, 44 CONN. L. REV. 99, 115 (2011) (describing the results of 52 sur-
veys and 20 interviews, which revealed that the majority of the lawyers, case workers, and
judges in the immigrant family separation cases surveyed had encountered "cases in which
one or more family members were in detention facilities ... at least one to five times in the
past five years, and many reported encounters with such cases significantly more than five
times in the past five years"); Andrew Becker c Anna Gorman, Nonviolent Crimes and Deporta-
tion, LA TImEs, Apr. 15, 2009, at A20 ("The Human Rights Watch report estimates the de-
portations have caused the separation of more than I million family members."); Julie Gil-
bert Rosicky & Felicity Sackville Northcott, Expanding the Meaning of Interjurisdictional:
International Issues in Child Welfare, INT'L Soc. SERVICE: U.S. BRANCH, INc., http://wwW.iss-
usa.org/uploads/file/Expanding%20the%2Meaning%20of%201nterjurisdictional.pdf (not-
ing that one of the ways children become separated from their families is when "[p]arent(s)
are sent to their home country through immigration enforcement-the child is a US citizen
and is taken in to social service custody").
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fectively facilitate the removal of children from their undocumented
immigrant parents and justify the termination of parental rights."
Parents have a constitutional right to the care and control of their
children and, under established case law, courts may not terminate the
rights of fit parents.' 2 The Tennessee Department of Children's Ser-
vices returned Gurrolla's children but, in many similar cases, the paren-
tal rights of undocumented immigrants are ignored and replaced with
a best interest of the child standard. This best interest standard is then
used to justify terminating the undocumented parent's rights.' 3 The
movement to replace the parental rights standard with a best interest of
the child standard has been growing over the 1990s and through the
new millennium but, in the context of immigrant children best interest
considerations, are poised to supplant all other considerations when
determining the care and custody of immigrant children.14
This Article explores the issue of immigrant family separations and
parental rights terminations and analyzes the legal, social, and bureau-
cratic frameworks in which these decisions occur. Part I of this Article
shows that removing immigrant children from parental care conflicts
with both established constitutional principles regarding family integrity
and assumptions undergirding traditional immigration law. Part II dem-
onstrates that, despite this conflict, removals are in strong accord with
the changing focus of family law and policy. Specifically, the removal of
children from undocumented parents is the result of the success and
substantial influence of the Children's Rights Movement and its empha-
sis on best interest considerations. Part D1 discusses cases involving the
11 See Posting of Norman Pflanz, npflanz@neappleseed.org, to help-immigemplrights
@yahoogrups.com (Jul. 30, 2009) (on file with author) (describing a study by Nebraska
Appleseed that revealed: "1. The Nebraska Department of Health and Human Services
removes children of non-citizens from their parents at higher rates than children of citi-
zens. 2. Immigrant families are more likely not to be provided a case plan in their native
language nor informed about local resources available to them. 3. Once in the system,
these families face language, cultural, and oftentimes, geographic barriers to receiving
services necessary for reunification. 4. Based on these factors, immigrant families are more
likely to be broken apart than families in which all members are U.S. citizens").
12 See Elizabeth Bartholet, Taking Adoption Seriously: Radical Revolution or Modest Revision-
ism?, 28 CAP. U. L. REV. 77, 85-86 (1999); infra notes 49-60 and accompanying text.
1s See, e.g., In reAngelica L., 767 N.W.2d 74, 94 (Neb. 2009); Anita C. v. Superior Court,
No. B213283, 2009 WL 2859068, at *9 (Cal. Ct. App. Sept. 8, 2009); infra notes 270-309
and accompanying text.
14 See, e.g., Elizabeth Bartholet, The Racial Disproportionality Movement in Child Welfare:
False Facts and Dangerous Directions, 51 ARIz. L. REv.871, 897 (2009) (discussing the rise of
the children's rights movement and the increasing focus on best interest analyses); infra
notes 54-65 and accompanying text. In fact, the reach and importance of the best interest
analysis has been steadily increasing since the 1990s.
66 [Vol. 32:63
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termination of parental rights of undocumented parents. These cases
demonstrate the power and persuasiveness of best interest arguments
and the receptiveness of courts and agencies to those arguments. Part IV
discusses the lack of court and state agency consideration for immigrant
parents' post-deportation circumstances in best interest analyses. Part V
summarizes the arguments that states and agencies use to persuade
courts that permanently removing children from the care of fit but un-
documented parents is in the child's best interest. Finally, Part VI dis-
cusses the problems with relying on a best interest standard, looking to
American history for comparisons and also examines whether these re-
movals have gone too far and exceeded public support for elevating
children's rights over parental rights. The broader normative question
of whether such removals are justifiable on moral or policy grounds,
and whether the law can and should be changed to permit them, are
explored in a companion article.15
I. OVERVIEW OF THE TERMINATION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS
For decades, the law has struggled with the tension between chil-
dren's rights and parental rights. Although not inevitable, the recogni-
tion of one has often meant the diminishment of the other. U.S. case
law has long favored parental rights over children's rights and, absent a
clear showing of serious, perhaps detrimental harm, courts did not
question parental decisions concerning children.16 As long as a paren-
tal decision was not gravely injurious, the fact that it might not be in the
child's best interest was irrelevant.17 Cases covering a wide range of is-
sues-from minors' marriages, abortions, discipline, and speech-all
demonstrate the deference given to parental decisions concerning
their children, even when such deference comes at the expense of a
child's best interest.'8
15 See generally Marcia Zug, Should I Stay or Should I Go: Why Immigrant Reunification Deci-
sions Should Be Based on the Best Interest of the Child, 2011 BYU L. REv. 1139 (discussing the
moral and policy justifications of removal and suggesting a shifting standard for when to
use a parental rights or best interest analysis).
16 See, e.g., Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65-66 (2000); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S.
205, 229-30 (1972); Willis v. State, 888 N.E.2d 177, 180 (Ind. 2008).
17 See Troxel, 530 U.S. at 65-66; Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 753 (1981); Stanley v.
Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651(1972).
i8 See, e.g., Troxe, 530 U.S. at 75 (noting that a state law that allowed any third party to
petition for child visitation rights over parental objections violated the fundamental right
of parents to raise their children); Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833,
899-900 (1992) (holding that the state may require that an unemancipated woman under
the age of eighteen obtain informed parental consent, even if this requires an in-person
20121 67
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A. The Parental Rights Doctrine
Every day, hundreds, perhaps thousands of parents lose custody of
their children.19 The standard for initial removal is often low.20 Children
are typically removed due to allegations of abuse and neglect and, in a
handful of states, children can even be removed when courts simply de-
termine that removal is in their "best interest."21 Unlike removal, how-
ever, the standard for termination is rigorous and is not solely based on
a child's best interest.22 When considering termination of parental
rights, a best interest analysis is an appropriate consideration only after a
finding of unfitness.23 Parents have a constitutional right to the care and
custody of their children and only unfit parents lose this right.24
visit by the parent to the facility and the imposition of a twenty-four-hour waiting period);
Yoder, 406 U.S. at 234 (holding that the state cannot compel school attendance past eighth
grade, as this requirement would violate the fundamental right to direct the religious up-
bringing of children); Willis, 888 N.E.2d at 184 (setting aside the conviction of a parent
who used physical force to discipline her child on the basis of parental privilege).
19 See The AFCARS Report, U.S. DEPARTMENT HEALTH & HUMAN SERVICES, ADMIN. FOR
CHILD. & FAM. (Oct. 2009), http://www.acf.hhs.gov/programs/cb/stats-research/afcars/
tar/reportl6.htm (finding that 273,000 children entered foster care in 2008).
20 See Theo Liebmann, What's Missing fom Foster Care Reform? The Need for Comprehensive,
Realistic, and Compassionate Removal Standards, 28 HAMLINEJ. PUB. L. & POL'Y 141, 145 (2006)
(describing the standard as having a "remarkably narrow and short-sighted perspective").
21 See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 19-1-115 (2011) (allowing a court to remove a child
from his or her home according to the child's best interest); MASS. GEN. LAws ch. 119,
§ 29C (2010) (allowing removal when continuation the in home is contrary to the child's
best interest); OR. REV. STAT. § 419B.150(2) (b) (2009) (allowing protective custody when
it is in best interests of child). The majority of states require "that the risk of harm in the
child's home be analyzed, and if that risk meets a certain level-usually 'imminent,' 'seri-
ous' or some combination thereof-then a removal is deemed warranted." See Liebmann,
supra note 20, at 145-46; see, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. § 46b-129(B) (1) (2011) (allowing re-
moval when the child is in immediate danger and it is necessary to ensure the child's
safety); HAw. REV. STAT. § 587A-8 (2011) (allowing removal when continued placement
with the parents presents a risk of imminent harm); 705 ILL. COMP. STAT. 405/2-10 (1999)
(allowing removal when there is an immediate and urgent necessity for the safety and pro-
tection of the child); IND. CODE § 31-34-2-3(a) (1) (2011) (allowing removal when a child's
physical or mental condition will be seriously impaired or endangered if not immediately
taken into custody); MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAw § 5-709(a) (2) (LexisNexis 2011) (allowing
removal for a child in serious, immediate danger); Mo. REv. STAT. § 210.125.2 (2011) (al-
lowing removal for a child in imminent danger of serious physical harm or upon a threat
to his or her life).
22 See, e.g., In re D.T., 818 N.E.2d 1214, 1227 (Ill. 2004); In re Terrance G., 731 N.Y.S.2d
832, 847 (Fam. Ct. 2001).
25 See, e.g., In reD.T, 818 N.E.2d at 1227 (explaining that once a parent is found unfit,
then all considerations must yield to the best interest of the child); In re P.L., 778 N.W. 2d
33, 36 (Iowa 2010) (noting that in the 1970s "scholars began questioning the best interest
standard used by the courts to terminate parental rights" and that this standard was ulti-
mately rejected because a best interests test "provided little or no guidance for the court in
deciding when to terminate a parent's parental rights"); In re Terrance G., 731 N.YS.2d at
68 [Vol. 32:63
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In the 1972 case of Stanley v. Illinois, the Supreme Court struck
down an Illinois state law automatically depriving unmarried fathers of
custody of their biological children upon the death of the mother.25
The statute in Stanley reflected the state's assumption that being raised
by a single father is not in a child's best interest.26 The Supreme Court
found this consideration irrelevant.27 The Stanley Court held that,
unless a parent is shown to be unfit, the parent has the constitutional
right to the care and upbringing of his or her children.28 Therefore,
the Court found it unconstitutional to require the father to prove that
he had a right to raise his children.29
Ten years later, the Court decided Santosky v. Kramer30 The Santosky
Court declared unconstitutional a New York statute permitting deter-
minations of "permanent neglect" to be based on a "fair preponder-
ance of the evidence."3' The Court explained that the parental right to
the care and custody of children is a fundamental liberty interest and
concluded that, before a state may terminate parental rights, it must
support its allegations by at least "clear and convincing evidence."32
Then, in June of 2000, the Supreme Court decided Troxel v. Gran-
ville, reaffirming the importance of parental rights and the inapplicabil-
847 ("'In many cases the State may, and under some legal systems undoubtedly does, find
"better" parents for a child even though the natural parents may be willing and able to
provide proper care.' But it is fundamental to our legal and social system, that it is in the
best interest of a child to be raised by his parents, unless the parents are unfit .. . .") (in-
ternal citation omitted) (quoting In re Sanjivini K., 391 N.E.2d 1316, 1321 (N.Y. 1971));
Developments in the Law: The Law of Marriage and Family, 116 HARV. L. REv. 1996, 2119
(2003) (arguing that the state's role must be "restricted to the goal of ensuring parental
fitness, not extended to protect the relative and potentially imprecise 'best interest' of the
child"); Michael S. Wald, State Intervention on Behalf of "Neglected" Children: Standards for Re-
moval of Children from Their Homes, Monitoring the Status of Children in Foster Care, and Termina-
tion of ParentalRights, 28 STAN. L. REv. 623, 637 (1976).
24 See, e.g., Santosky, 455 U.S. at 753 (describing this right as "a fundamental liberty in-
terest").
25 Stanley, 405 U.S. at 658.
26 See id. at 648.
27 See id. at 654-55, 658.
28 See id. at 658.
29 See id.; see also Santosky, 455 U.S. at 767 (explaining that a child may only be removed
and placed in another home "'when it is clear that the natural parent cannot or will not pro-
vide a normal family home for the child'") (quoting N.Y. Soc. SERV. LAW § 384-b.1(a) (iv)
(McKinney 2011).
so Santosky, 455 U.S. at 770.
31 See id. at 748, 768.
32 Id. at 769; see also Smith v. Org. of Foster Families for Equal. & Reform, 431 U.S. 816,
846-47 (1977) (refusing to grant constitutional protections to foster parents that would
infringe on the constitutional right of parents to the care and custody of their children).
2012] 69
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ity of a best interest standard. 3 The Troxel Court described the "interest
of parents in the care, custody, and control of their children [a] s per-
haps the oldest of the fundamental liberty interests recognized by [the]
Court" and held that
so long as a parent adequately cares for his or her children
(i.e., is fit), there will normally be no reason for the State to
inject itself into the private realm of the family to further
question the ability of that parent to make the best decisions
concerning the rearing of that parent's children.34
These Supreme Court cases illustrate what is often referred to as
the parental rights doctrine.35 This doctrine holds that children should
remain with their birth parents "and that the state should play an ex-
tremely limited role in overseeing the conditions of their lives . ... "36
These cases reflect the strong constitutional protections afforded paren-
tal rights and the limited role the government is expected to play in su-
pervising what occurs within the family.37 Put simply, this means that
parents must exercise a minimum degree of care and, unless they are
found to be unfit for falling below this low standard of care, the state
may not interfere with the custody and care of their children.38 Conse-
See Troxel, 530 U.S. at 72-73.
3 Id. at 65, 68-69; see also id. at 96 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) ("For that reason, '[s]hort of
preventing harm to the child,' the court considered the best interests of the child to be 'in-
sufficient to serve as a compelling state interest overruling a parent's fundamental rights.'")
(quoting In re Smith, 969 P.2d 21, 30 (Wash. 1998)); MARTIN GUGGENHEIM, WHAT'S WRONG
wrrH CHILDREN's RIGHTs 38-39 (2005) ("The parental rights doctrine protects parents from
having to defend their right to their children's custody on grounds that parental custody
would further the children's best interests. A best interests inquiry is not a neutral investiga-
tion that leads to an obvious result. It is an intensely value-laden inquiry. And it cannot be
otherwise.").
3 See Troxel, 530 U.S. at 72-75; Santosky, 455 U.S. at 767; Stanley, 405 U.S. at 648; see also
Annette Ruth Appell, Virtual Mothers and the Meaning of Parenthood, 34 U. MICH. J. L. RE-
FORM 683, 688-89 (2001) ("'Parental rights doctrine' refers to the ... doctrine that defines
parents and limits intervention into the family.").
36 GUGGENHEIM, supra note 34, at 36.
3 See Troxel, 530 U.S. at 72-75; Santosky, 455 U.S. at 767; Stanley, 405 U.S. at 648; see also
GUGGENHEIM, supra note 34, at 36 (stating that, under this doctrine, the government's role
is limited to defining the "outer limits of what is acceptable parenting"). "Government
bureaucracies ('impersonal political institutions' in the language of the Supreme Court)
have been criticized for being inept at many functions." GUGGENHEIM, supra note 34, at 38.
Therefore, because government bureaucracies are likely inept in making best interest ana-
lyses, they should limit-rather than encourage-their own involvement in such decisions.
See id. This doctrine thus prevents "state officials, who will never know children better than
the adults who have directly nurtured them, from making childrearing decisions." Id.
3 See Troxe4 530 U.S. at 72-75; Santosky, 455 U.S. at 767; Stanley, 405 U.S. at 648; GUG-
GENHEIM, supra note 34, at 36.
[Vol. 32:6370
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quently, the current state of the law regarding parental rights can be
described as a fitness standard.39 It is not a best interest of the child
standard.A
B. Immigrant Parents' Rights
The constitutional rights of parents are not confined to citizens. 41
Immigrant parents also have the right to the care and custody of their
children, and U.S. immigration law assumes that immigrant parents will
retain custody of their children regardless of immigration status.42 In
fact, immigration decisions are often based on the assumption that
children and parents will be reunited in the parents' country of origin
after deportation.43
For example, the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) specifically
held that, when an alien-parent's child "is below the age of discretion,
... it is his parents' decision whether to take him along to leave him in
this country when and if they are deported."4 Many courts have re-
peatedly affirmed this conclusion.4 5 In fact, immigration authorities are
so skeptical of parents' claims that deportation will result in separation
3 See Troxel, 530 U.S. at 72-75; Santosky, 455 U.S. at 767; Stanley, 405 U.S. at 648; GUG-
GENHEIM, supra note 34, at 36-37.
4o See Troxel, 530 U.S. at 72-75; Santosky, 455 U.S. at 767; Stanley, 405 U.S. at 648; GUG-
GENHEIM, supra note 34, at 36-37.
41 See Troxel, 530 U.S. at 65; ick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 369 (1886). The Su-
preme Court has held that constitutional protections of the "Fourteenth Amendment ...
[are] not confined to the protection of citizens .... [The] provisions are universal in their
application, to all persons within the territorial jurisdiction, without regard to any differ-
ences of race, of color, or of nationality .... " Yick Wo, 118 U.S. at 369; see also Plyler v. Doe,
457 U.S. 202, 210 (1982) ("Whatever his status under the immigration laws, an alien is
surely a 'person' in any ordinary sense of that term."). That Congress's power over tmmi-
gration is considered plenary means two things: "[f]irst, Congress's authority to regulate
immigration derives not from any constitutionally enumerated power, but rather is 'inher-
ent' in the United States' 'sovereignty' as an independent nation. Second, in its exercise of
that authority, Congress-and, by delegation, the Executive-is buffered against judicially
enforceable constitutional constraints." Matthew J. Lindsay, Immigration as Invasion: Sover-
eignty, Security, and the Origins of the Federal Immigration Power, 45 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1, 3
(2010).
42 See Newton v. INS, 736 F.2d 336, 343 (6th Cir. 1984); Ayala-Flores v. INS, 662 F.2d
444, 446 (6th Cir. 1981); In re B & J, 756 N.W.2d 234, 239-40 (Mich. Ct. App. 2008) (citing
Liu v. U.S. Dep't ofJustice, 13 F.3d 1175, 1177 (8th Cir. 1994)).
43 See Newton, 736 F.2d at 343; Ayala-Flores, 662 F.2d at 446; In re B &J, 756 N.W.2d at
239-40.
4 Liu, 13 F.3d at 1177; see also Newton, 736 F.2d at 343; Ayala-Flores, 662 F.2d at 446; In re
B &J, 756 N.W.2d at 240 n.5 (citing Liu, 13 F.3d at 1177).
45 See Marcia Zug, Deporting Grandma: Why Grandparent Deportation May Be the Next Big
Immigration Crisis and Hotw to Solve It, 43 U.C. DAvis L. REv. 193, 218-19 (2009) (providing
examples of many similar immigration decisions).
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from their children that parents must present significant proof that
they will not take the children with them upon deportation.46 Even
then, the BIA has held that "absent proof of extreme hardship to a
child if he returns to his parents' native country with them, [it] will
generally consider the decision to leave the child in the United States
to be a matter of personal choice."47 Consequently, regardless of status,
immigrants have the same legal right to the care and custody of their
children as all other American parents.4
II. THE CONTROVERSIAL RISE OF THE CHILDREN'S RIGHTS MOVEMENT
Parents have a constitutional right to the care and custody of their
children.49 Moreover, the constitutional rights of parents are not con-
fined to citizens, as immigrant parents also have the right to the care
and custody of their children.50 Since the mid-1990s, however, the tradi-
tional deference accorded to parental rights has weakened.51 Increas-
ingly, critics are calling for best interest considerations to trump paren-
46 See id. at 219. Parents claiming that deportation will result in separation, thereby
creating extreme hardship, must present the government with proof of intention to sepa-
rate; immigration courts repeatedly reject such claims based on a lack of proof. See id.; see
also In relge, 20 1. & N. Dec. 880, 885 (B.I.A. 1994) (stating that "[t]he claim that the child
will remain in the United States can easily be made for purposes of litigation, but most
parents would not carry out such an alleged plan in reality").
4 In re Ige, 20 I. & N. Dec. at 886.
48 See id.; Zug, supra note 45, at 218-19. Many challenges to deportation claim that the re-
sultant family separation violates the constitutional rights of the U.S. citizen children. See Zug,
supra note 45, at 219-20. Those challenges, however, normally fail because courts assume that
separation is a choice. See id. When separation cannot be considered a choice, then the pos-
sibility of a successful constitutional challenge increases greatly. See, e.g., id.; More Than 100
Kids Sue Over Parents'Deportations, USA TODAY (June 17, 2009), http://www.usatoday.com/
news/nation/2009-06-17-deportation_N.htm (describing a constitutional challenge brought
by 150 U.S. citizen children protesting their parents' deportations).
4 See Bartholet, supra note 12, at 85-86; Zug, supra note 45, at 218-20.
s0 See Newton v. INS, 736 F.2d 336, 343 (6th Cir. 1984); In re Ige, 20 . & N. Dec. 880,
886 (B.I.A. 1994); Zug, supra note 45, at 218-20.
51 Compare Solangel Maldonado, When Father (or Mother) Doesn't Know Best: Quasi-Parents
and Parental Deference After Troxel v. Granville, 88 IOWA L. REv. 865, 871 (2003) (arguing
against the idea that parental rights are justified based on the parents' greater likelihood
of acting in their child's best interest), with Emily Buss, Essay, "Parental" Rights, 88 VA. L.
REv. 635, 647 (2002) ("Parents' strong emotional attachment to their children and consid-
erable knowledge of their particular needs make parents the child-specific experts most
qualified to assess and pursue their children's best interests in most circumstances. In con-
trast, the state's knowledge of and commitment to any particular child is relatively thin.").
This weakness is shown by the prevalence of best interest arguments in courtrooms, child
welfare administrations, and the legislature. See Maldonado, supra, at 871-72.
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tal rights.5 2 This change, combined with the vulnerable position occu-
pied by minorities and undocumented immigrants, may explain the
otherwise surprising receptivity with which a number of courts have
received best interest arguments in undocumented immigrant parent
termination cases.53
A. The Child Welfare System
The importance of parental rights continues, but has begun to
weaken, and this is particularly true in the context of the child welfare
system. 54 Traditionally, the emphasis on parental rights meant that fam-
ily preservation was the clear goal of the child welfare system.55 Conse-
quently, removing children to facilitate adoption was not considered a
desirable option.56
Beginning in the 1990s, however, leading scholars-such as Eliza-
beth Bartholet, Richard Banks, and Richard Barth-began to voice
their strong opposition to the traditional approach of the child welfare
system.57 They argued that a child welfare system that ultimately aims to
protect the rights of parents is one that neglects the rights and perhaps
endangers the lives of children.58 Their work criticized the traditional
52 See In reD.T., 818 N.E.2d 1214, 1220 (Ill. 2004); In reB &J, 756 N.W.2d 234, 240-41
(Mich. Ct. App. 2008); Bartholet, supra note 12, at 89-90.
5s See In re D.T, 818 N.E.2d at 1220; In reB &j, 756 N.V.2d at 240-41; see, e.g., Bar-
tholet, supra note 12, at 89-90; Maldonado, supra note 51, at 871-72.
54 See In re D.T, 818 N.E.2d at 1220; In re B &J, 756 N.W.2d at 240-41; see, e.g., Bar-
tholet, supra note 12, at 89-90; Maldonado, supra note 51, at 871-72.
55 Bartholet, supra note 12, at 85-86 ("Family preservation has always been the domi-
nant modus operandi in the child welfare system.").
56 See id. at 86. Adoption was considered a last resort for exceptional situations, and
was not perceived "as a normal and appropriate way to arrange for the care of children
whose birth parents cannot or will not provide care." See id.
- See id. at 84-86; Raymond C. O'Brien, An Analysis ofRealistic Due Process Rights of Chil-
dren Versus Parents, 26 CONN. L. REv. 1209, 1211-13, 1234-35, 1251-52 (1994). See generally
ELIZABETH BARTHOLET, NOBODY'S CHILDREN: ABUSE AND NEGLECT, FOSTER DRIFT, AND
THE ADOPTION ALTERNATIVE (1999) (discussing the history of the child welfare system and
how it does not take into account the best interest of the child); R. Richard Banks, The
Color ofDesire: Fulfilling Adoptive Parents' Racial Preferences Through Discriminatory State Action,
107 YALE LJ. 875 (1998) (stating that race preferences in adoption are harmful because
they limit the likelihood of adoption and arguing for a strict non-accommodation policy
that would prevent adoption agencies from facilitating these racial preferences); Richard
P. Barth, Abusive and Neglecting Parents and the Care of Their Children, in ALL OUR FAMILIES:
NEW POLICIES FOR A NEW CENTURY 217 (Mary Ann Mason et al. eds., 1998) (arguing for
less emphasis on family preservation and more on children's developmental needs, per-
manency, and adoption to meet those needs).
5s See Bartholet, supra note 12, at 84-86; O'Brien, supra note 57, at 1211-13, 1251-52.
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emphasis on family preservation and parental rights.59 Instead, they
sought increased attention to the child's best interest, which they fre-
quently argued was the permanency and stability that could only be
achieved through adoption.60
This emerging Children's Rights Movement succeeded in placing
best interest considerations in the mind of the public.61 The final years
of the twentieth century witnessed a dramatic reversal in attitudes re-
garding family preservation, adoption, and children's rights. 62 Adop-
tion, traditionally reserved for only the most exceptional circumstances,
was increasingly viewed as the ultimate goal.63 This policy shift is exem-
plified in two significant Congressional acts-the Adoption and Safe
Families Act (ASFA) and the Multiethnic Placement Act (MEPA)-a
model law on adoption known as the Uniform Adoption Act (UAA),
and a special immigration status for children called Special Immigra-
tion Juvenile (SIJ).64 All of these changes dramatically aided efforts to
focus the child welfare system's attention on the best interest of the
child rather than family preservation.65
B. The ASFA, MEPA, UAA, SIJ Status and the Triumph of Children's Rights
Congress enacted the ASFA in response to the Adoption Assistance
and Child Welfare Act (AACWA) and it represented a drastic shift in
policy. 66 Congress had previously passed the Adoption Assistance and
5 See Bartholet, supra note 12, at 84-86; O'Brien, supra note 57, at 1211-13, 1251-52.
6 See Bartholet, supra note 12, at 84-87. Consequently, Bartholet has argued that, be-
cause of this lack of willingness to consider adoption, "[flamily preservation has been
regularly promoted and defended on the basis of a claim that the only alternative for chil-
dren is foster and institutional care." Id. at 86.
61 See Bartholet, supra note 12, at 84-85; Bartholet, supra note 14, at 897.
62 See Bartholet, supra note 12, at 84-85; Bartholet, supra note 14, at 897. For example,
new research in the 1990s called into doubt the benefit of Intensive Family Preservation
Services (IFPS), programs that were popular in the 1970s and 1980s. See Bartholet, supra
note 12, at 84. During the 1980s, many jurisdictions adopted the IFPS model of "family
preservation." See Bartholet, supra note 14, at 896. "The basic idea was to prevent children
described as 'at risk of placement' from being removed from their parents and placed in
foster care. Child abuse and neglect was conceived of as occurring because of a crisis in the
family, which could be resolved by intensive but short-term supportive services." Id.
63 See Bartholet, supra note 12, at 84-85 (describing perceptions of adoption).
- 8 C.F.R. § 204.11 (2010); UNIF. ADOPTION ACT (amended 1994), 9 U.L.A. 11 (2011).
65 See Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-89, 111 Stat. 2115 (codi-
fied in scattered sections of 42. U.S.C. (2006)); Howard Metzenbaum Multiethnic Place-
ment Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-382, 108 Stat. 3518, 4056 (repealed); 8 C.F.R. § 204.11;
UNIF. ADOPTION ACT, 9 U.L.A. 11; infra notes 72-113 and accompanying text.
6 See 111 Stat. at 2115; ROBERT MNOOKIN & D. KELLY WEISBERG, CHILD, FAMILY, AND
STATE: PROBLEMS AND MATERIALS ON CHILDREN AND THE LAw 353 (6th ed. 2009).
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Child Welfare Act in 1980.67 The primary objective of the AACWA was
to help find permanent homes for children.68 The AACWA's method
for achieving this goal, however, was firmly rooted in the traditional
ideas of family preservation.69 The AACWA sought to achieve perma-
nency by addressing the problems that could lead to removal and by
aiding in the return of children to their families after they had been
removed.70 By the 1990s, however, the benefits of family preservation
were increasingly being questioned and the AACWA became subject to
mounting criticism.7'
The ASFA came as a response to these growing criticisms and one
of its major reforms clarified the AACWA's "reasonable efforts" stan-
dard.72 Under the AACWA, states were required to make reasonable
efforts to prevent the removal of children from their homes and to re-
unify them with their families following removal.73 Although the
AACWA did not specify the meaning of reasonable efforts, the ASFA
expressed a clear statement that reunification is not possible or desir-
able in all cases. 74 Another change was the ASFA's strong approval of
adoption.75 The ASFA promotes adoption by reducing the amount of
67 Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act, Pub. L. No. 96-272, 944 Stat. 500 (codi-
fied as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.). The Community Partnership Move-
ment, another family preservation movement, also gained popularity during this period.
Like IFPS, the goal of this movement was "to keep more children identified as at risk for
maltreatment with their parents, and the idea again is that, with more supportive services
for those parents, the children can be kept safe." Bartholet, supra note 14, at 897.
68 42 U.S.C. § 670; BARTHOLET, supra note 57, at 25.
69 42 U.S.C. § 670; BARTHOLET, supra note 57, at 25-26.
7o MNOOKIN & WEISBERG, supra note 66, at 353. Congress facilitated this goal by provid-
ing states with federal matching funds for foster care and adoption services if states adopted
certain standards. Id.; see 42 U.S.C. § 670. Specifically, the Act requires that
(1) [S]tates must formulate case plans ("permanency planning") that are de-
signed to achieve placement in the least possible restrictive setting, (2) states
must conduct periodic case reviews, and (3) states must make "reasonable ef-
forts" to prevent removal of children from the home and to reunify the family
following removal .... Through these provisions Congress attempted to shift re-
sources from temporary out-of-home care and to focus on channeling resources
either to a child's natural family or to other permanent care alternatives.
MNOOKIN & WEISBERG, supra note 66, at 353.
71 See BARTHOLET, supra note 57, at 26; Bartholet, supra note 12, at 84-86.
7 2 Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-89, 111 Stat. 2115 (codified
in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.); MNooxIN & WEISBERG, supra note 66, at 353.
7 See Adoption and Safe Families Act § 101(a) (15) (D), 42 U.S.C. § 671(a) (15) (D)
(2006).
74 Id. § 101 (a) (15) (A); see Bartholet, supra note 12, at 85.
75 See Adoption and Safe Families Act § 101 (a) (15) (C), 42 U.S.C. § 671 (a) (15) (C);
Bartholet, supra note 12, at 85.
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time a child spends in foster care while waiting to reunite with his or
her parents. 76 Under the ASFA, permanency hearings are now required
no later than twelve months after a child enters foster care. Further-
more, states must seek termination of parental rights when children are
in foster care for fifteen out of twenty-two consecutive months." Such
changes demonstrated a shift away from parental rights and toward a
greater emphasis on children's rights. 78 These changes highlighted the
increasing importance of children's rights and emphasized the position
that a parent's right to reunification should not come at the expense of
a child's right to stability and permanence.79
A second piece of legislation Congress passed during this period is
the MEPA.so Prior to the MEPA, many states had laws and policies dis-
couraging interracial adoptions and instead promoting same-race
adoptions.81 State legislatures passed these laws after the National Asso-
ciation of Black Social Workers (NABSW) expressed strong opposition
to the increasing incidence of white families adopting black children in
the 1960s and '70s. 82 The NABSW described such adoptions as "a form
of race and cultural genocide."" Transracial adoptions dramatically
decreased as a result of this condemnation.84
After the NABSW's condemnation, many states enacted race-
matching laws that required the consideration of a child's race in adop-
tion placements and gave preference to families with the same racial or
ethnic make-up.8 States without specific race-matching statutes often
76 See Adoption and Safe Families Act § 101(a) (15) (C), 42 U.S.C. § 671 (a) (15) (C).
77 42 U.S.C. § 675(5) (E).
78 Bartholet, supra note 14, at 928 (describing the ASFA as a "good law because it shifts
the balance in child welfare law and policy somewhat in the direction of valuing children's
rights more, and parents' rights less").
79 See Bartholet, supra note 14, at 928.
m Howard Metzenbaum Multiethnic Placement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-382, 108
Stat. 3518, 4056 (repealed).
81 See Solangel Maldonado, Discouraging Racial Preferences in Adoptions, 39 U.C. DAVIs L.
REv. 1415, 1455 n.197 (2006) (noting that "Arizona, Nevada, and Missouri had race match-
ing policies that required that a child be available for adoption for a certain period of time
before he or she could be adopted by a family of a different race").
8 Maldonado, supra note 81, at 1454-55.
8 Id. at 1455 (internal quotation marks omitted).
8 Id. ("Although most African Americans disagreed with the NABSW's views, transra-
cial adoptions decreased dramatically after its statement.") (internal citations omitted).
85 See id. at 1455 (citing David S. Rosettenstein, Trans-Racial Adoption and the Statutory
Preference Schemes: Before the "Best Interests" and After the "Melting Pot," 68 ST. JOHN's L. REv.
137, 140 n.9 (noting that such informal policies in favor of race matching became part of
department practice manuals)).
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adopted informal race-matching policies.86 By the 1990s, however, chil-
dren's rights advocates were increasingly concerned that, because the
majority of adoptive parents were white while the majority of children
awaiting adoption were not, many children in foster care were not be-
ing adopted as a result of their race.87
Congress passed MEPA in 1994 to reverse these race-matching
policies.88 Like the ASFA, MEPA expressed Congress's clear approval of
adoption and its desire to increase the number of adoptions of foster
children.89 The goal of MEPA was to increase adoptions by ensuring
that race would not be a controlling factor in adoption decisions.90
Congress passed the law to make sure that children would not remain
in foster care when there were families, regardless of race, willing to
adopt them.91 Initially, MEPA did not meet much success because it
permitted race to continue as a factor in placement decisions. 92 State
race-matching continued after MEPA's enactment and, as a result, Con-
gress amended MEPA.93
The MEPA amendments prohibit federally funded agencies from
"deny[ing] to any individual the opportunity to become an adoptive or
a foster parent, on the basis of race, color, or national origin of the in-
dividual, or of the child, involved . ... "4 After its amendment, MEPA
expressly prohibited race-matching or any other consideration of race
in placement decisions.95 Since the amendments' passage, federal en-
forcement has become vigorous.96 The U.S. Department of Health and
a6 See Maldonado, supra note 81, at 1455.
87 See id. at 1455-56.
8 Howard Metzenbaum Multiethnic Placement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-382, 108
Stat. 3518, 4056 (repealed) (codified at 42 U.S.C.A § 5115a (West 1995)); SeeBartholet, supra
note 12, at 85 (stating that "[g]iven that the near-universal policy and practice throughout
the nation had been for child welfare agencies to place children with same-race families if at
all possible, this law was truly revolutionary in concept").
8 108 Stat. at 4056; see Maldonado, supra, note 81, at 1456. See generally Adoption and
Safe Families Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-89, 111 Stat. 2115 (codified as amended in scat-
tered sections of 42 U.S.C. (2006)).
9 See 108 Stat. at 4056; Maldonado, supra, note 81, at 1456.
91 See 108 Stat. at 4056; Maldonado, supra note 81, at 1455 ("Some African American
children remained in foster care indefinitely, even though there were white families willing
to adopt them.").
9 See Maldonado, supra note 81, at 1455-56.
9 Small BusinessJob Protection Act of 1996 § 1808(c), Pub. L. No. 104-188, 110 Stat.
1755, 1904 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1996(b) (1) (A)); see Maldonado, supra note
81, at 1456-57.
- 42 U.S.C. § 1996b(1) (A).
- 42 U.S.C. § 1996b(1) (A) (2006); see Maldonado, supra note 81, at 1456-57.
96 See Bartholet, supra note 14, at 928.
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Human Services (DHHS) has imposed significant financial penalties
upon a number of states for MEPA violations and has forced many
more to modify placement practices. 97 The DHHS has thus demon-
strated its strong commitment to enforcing MEPA.98 Its hope is that
vigorous enforcement will finally achieve the goals of MEPA and in-
crease the adoptions of foster children.99
At the same time Congress was enacting MEPA and the ASFA, the
National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws pro-
posed the UAA. 00 The UAA is a model act that pertains to custody de-
terminations after failed or thwarted adoptions.101 Under the UAA, after
an adoption has failed, a court may conduct a hearing to consider
whether to allow non-parents to obtain custody rather than return the
child to his or her biological parents. 102 Consequently, when an adop-
tion fails to occur--often because there is no finding of unfitness or be-
cause the parent does not consent-the biological parent is not auto-
matically entitled to regain custody of his or her child. 03 Instead, the
court considers the best interest of the child and makes a determination
regarding with whom the child should be placed. 104 In these cases,
9 Elizabeth Bartholet, Commentary, Cultural Stereotypes Can and Do Die: It's Time to
Move on with Transracial Adoption, 34J. Am. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 315, 317-18 (2006). In
2003, Ohio was issued a penalty letter imposing a $1.8 million fine. Id. In 2005, South
Carolina received a penalty of $107,481. Id. at 317-19.
9 See Child Welfare Policy Manua4 U.S. DEPARTMENT HEALTH & Hum. SERVICES ADMIN.
FOR CHILD. & FAM. (Jul. 14, 2010), http://www.acf.hhs.gov/cwpm/programs/cb/laws-poli-
cies/laws/cwpm/policydsp.jsp?citID=171; Information Memorandum Im-03-01, U.S. DEPART-
MENT HEALTH & Hum. SERVICES ADMIN. FOR CHILD. & FAM. (Mar. 25, 2003), http://www.
acf.hhs.gov/programs/cb/laws-policies/policy/im/2003/im0301.htm.
9 See Maldonado, supra note 81, at 1458. In addition, the MEPA's enactment has also in-
fluenced private agencies, which are increasingly willing to place children trans-racially. See id.
(noting that "the majority of public agencies currently place children trans-racially, and most
private agencies, although not bound by MEPA, frequently place African American children
with white families").
too UNIF. ADOPTION ACT (amended 1994), 9 U.L.A. 11 (2011).
101 See id.
102 Id. Only Vermont has adopted the UAA. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15A, §§ 1-101-8-101
(2011). A number of states, however, have also enacted similar statutes. See, e.g., 750 ILL.
COMP. STAT. 50/20 (1999) (requiring a court to "promptly conduct a hearing as to the
temporary and permanent custody of the minor child who is the subject of the proceed-
ings" after an adoption petition has been denied or vacated).
103 See UNIF. ADOPTION ACT § 2-408 cmt. at 62 (amended 1994), 9 U.L.A. 60 (2011)
(stating that a court's conclusion that a parent is not unfit or does not consent to the
child's adoption "is not tantamount to a determination that the child must be placed in
that parent's custody").
104 Appell, supra note 35, at 728 n.191 (explaining that the UAA provides for a "deter-
mination whether return to the mother would be detrimental to the child when the
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courts redefine the term parent to include thwarted adoptive parents,
and thus, analyze these cases as a custody dispute.105 As a result, courts
are able to avoid the parental rights doctrine and apply the best interest
of the child standard. 106 Like the ASFA and the MEPA, the UAA evinces
a strong preference for adoption and a disinclination for reunification
and parental rights.107 Under the UAA, once a child is removed, he or
she is potentially adoptable, regardless of parental consent or fitness.108
The effect of such acts, particularly MEPA and the ASFA, cannot
be understated.1oo Although the majority of children (approximately
57%) still exit foster care through reunification, the rates of reunifica-
tion have declined dramatically. 110 Children who entered the foster
care system in 1997, the year the ASFA was passed, "had a 13% slower
rate to reunification than those who entered in 1990."111 In addition,
during this period, the number of children adopted from foster care
increased substantially. 12 Since the enactment of the ASFA, the major-
ity of states have doubled the number of children adopted out of foster
care and, in some states, that number has tripled.113
C. Children's Rights and Immigration Law
The increasing focus on children's rights also had an influence on
immigration law.' 14 In 1990, Congress changed immigration law to cre-
ate the SIJ nonimmigrant legal status category.1 15 Congress created the
SIJ status to ensure that undocumented children who were victims of
mother revokes her adoption consent after a failed attempt to have the father's rights ter-
minated and an adoption decree entered").
10 Naomi R. Cahn, Reframing Child Custody Decisionmaking, 58 OHIo ST. L.J. 1, 21-22
(1997) (noting that in these situations, courts transform a "potential adoption case be-
tween the biological parent and third parties into a custody case where the dispute is be-
tween the parents").
106 See id.
107 SeeAppell, supra note 35, at 728-29.
08 See id.
109 See Bartholet, supra note 12, at 83-90. But see Bartholet, supra note 14, at 871 (arguing
that the disproportionality movement, which seeks to reduce the disproportionate number of
African-American children in foster care, may indicate the beginnings of a swing back in the
direction of family preservation).
110 MNOOKIN & WEISBERG, supra note 66, at 332.
11 Id. at 333.
112 Id.
1 13 Id
114 See8 U.S.C. § 1101(a) (27) (J) (2006); 8 C.F.R. § 204.11 (2010); My Xuan T. Mai, Note,
Children Under the Radar: The Unique Plight oflImmigrantJuvenia, 12 BARRY L. REv. 241, 244
(2009).
11s See8 U.S.C. § 1101(a) (27) (J); 8 C.F.R. § 204.11.
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abuse and neglect would be permitted to remain and receive care in
the United States." 6 Congress's goal was to protect the best interests of
these vulnerable children.'17 Under the SIJ provision, once a child is
removed from parental care, declared dependent on a juvenile court,
and eligible for foster care, the child becomes eligible for legal status
adjustment as a SIJ.118 These children may then take steps to become
lawful permanent residents. 19 State regulations encourage caseworkers
to identify these children and assist them in petitioning for lawful per-
manent resident status, which may eventually lead to citizenship.120
The ASFA, MEPA, UAA, and SIJ status provisions were a clear re-
sponse to the growing influence of the Children's Rights Movement in
116 See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a) (27) (J); 8 C.F.R. § 204.11; see also Mai, supra note 114, at 244.
SIJ status functions as such:
SIJ status involves a finding by the Family Court in the jurisdiction where the
child lives that the child is dependent upon the family court, usually made in
guardianship or foster care proceedings, and then an application to U.S. Citi-
zenship and Immigration Services ... or made in open court where the child
is in removal proceedings. If granted, SIJ status results in adjustment to Law-
ful Permanent Resident status.
Jennifer L. Coyler et al., The Representational and Counseling Needs of the Immigrant Poor, 78
FORDHAM L. REv. 461, 470 n.34 (2009).
117 See Mai, supra note 114, at 244. Part of the impetus for creating this category was
the concern that undocumented children were not being removed from abusive and ne-
glectful homes out of fear that removal would lead to deportation. See id. ("Similar to the
Violence Against Women Act . . . , which provides aid to victims of domestic abuse, the SIJ
statute was Congress' answer to a moral crisis involving undocumented children suffering
neglect, abuse, or abandonment at the hands of those closest to them-their family.")
(internal citations omitted). One of the problems with the original act, however, was its
lack of clarity on whether it applied to children who had entered the country illegally. See
Gao v.Jenifer, 185 F.3d 548, 552 (6th Cir. 1999). The technical amendments to section 245
of the Immigration and Nationality Act rectified these problems. See Miscellaneous and
Technical Immigration Naturalization Amendments of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-232, 105
Stat. 1733, 1744 (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1255); 8 C.F.R. § 204.11. Subsection
245(h) of the Act permits adjustment of status regardless of the minor's original mode of
entry into the United States. 8 U.S.C. § 1255(h).
1s See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a) (27) (J); 8 C.F.R. § 204.11.
119 See Memorandum from Erwin McEwen, Director of the Department of Children and
Family Services, to DCFS and POS Child Welfare Staff Rules and Procedures Bookholders
(May 16, 2008), available at http://www.f2f.ca.gov/res/pdf/PolicyGuidelmmigration.pdf.
120 See, e.g., id. (describing the requirement of DCFS workers to determine a child's
citizenship "status and explain[] the benefits and services that may be unavailable to a
child who does not become a legal permanent resident of the United States"); see also Ce-
cilia Saco, An Overview of Immigration Issues and Child Welfare from a Social Worker's Perspective,
DEPARTMENT OF CHILD. & FAM. SERVICES (L.A. COUNTY) (Dec. 12, 2007), http://www.
f2f.ca.gov/res/pdf/BeyondTheBench.pdf (describing the work of the Special Immigrant
Status Unit, which files the SIJ status applications for undocumented children; and noting
that since 2006, the Unit had filed over 2400 applications for green cards).
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that they all place the needs and rights of children above those of par-
ents. 121 In short, they reflect the Children's Rights Movement's belief
that the child's best interest is of paramount importance. 122 In addition,
the influence of the Children's Rights Movement continues to grow
and is clearly reflected in undocumented immigrant parent termina-
tion cases.123 The Children's Rights Movement paved the way for the
use and acceptance of arguments favoring a child's best interest.124 And
such arguments are now being used to justify the removal of children
from fit, undocumented immigrant parents. 125 The following undocu-
mented immigrant cases reveal that courts and social workers are will-
ing to ignore parental rights and consider the best interest of the child
above all else.
III. IMMIGRANT TERMINATION CASES
Immigrant termination cases lie at the intersection of changing
law and policy. Although the law traditionally protected parental rights
and sought to ensure family integrity, children's rights have gained in-
creasing importance along with the belief that such rights include the
right to be with good, and not simply fit, parents. 126 These changing
beliefs are exemplified in undocumented immigrant parent termina-
tion cases, where such arguments are often accepted. In these termina-
tion cases, courts commonly acknowledge the traditional rule that a
parent must be deemed unfit before termination is appropriate, but
121 See Mai, supra note 114, at 246; supra notes 66-113 and accompanying text.
122 See Mai, supra note 114, at 246; supra notes 66-113 and accompanying text. These
acts have garnered significant academic support. See, e.g., Signithia Fordham, Racelessness as
a Factor in Black Students' School Success: Pragmatic Strategy or Pyrrhic Victory?, 58 HARv. EDUC.
REv. 54, 79-80 (1988) (discussing empirical research concluding that trans-racial adoption
yields academic advantages for black children); Kim Forde-Mazrui, Note, Black Identity and
Child Placement: The Best Interests of Black and Biracial Children, 92 MICH. L. REV. 925, 954
(1994) ("[A] white parent's denial of Black inferiority may be more believable because it is
less self-serving.").
2s See, e.g., Anita C. v. Superior Court, No. B213283, 2009 WL 2859068, at *9 (Cal. Ct.
App. Sept. 8, 2009); In re B &J, 756 N.W.2d at 240.
124 See, e.g., Anita C., 2009 WL 2859068, at *9; In reB &j, 756 N.W.2d at 240.
125 See, e.g., In re M.M., 587 S.E.2d 825, 832-33 (Ga. Ct. App. 2003); In re B &J 756
N.W.2d at 240.
126 See Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 72-75 (2000); Willis v. State, 888 N.E.2d 177, 184
(Ind. 2008) (implicitly refuting the position that parents who use corporal punishment are
unfit); Annette R. Appell, "Bad" Mothers and Spanish-Speaking Caregivers, 7 NEv. L.J. 759, 761
(2007); Teresa W.Julian et al., Cultural Vaiations in Parenting: Perceptions of Caucasian, African-
American, Hispanic, and Asian-American Parents, 43 FAM. REL. 30, 32 (1994).
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then terminate parental rights based on a finding that termination is in
the child's best interest, irrespective of parental fitness. 27
A. Fitness and Initial Removal
In undocumented immigrant termination cases, courts and wel-
fare agencies frequently conclude that a parent's undocumented status
alone demonstrates unfitness.128 These conclusions reveal a primary
concern with best interest considerations, as opposed to parental rights,
and an assumption that living with undocumented parents is not in a
child's best interest.'29 In these cases, the presumption of unfitness is
often apparent from the first removal decisions. 30 Many of these cases
begin with questionable charges of abuse and neglect.' 3 ' Accusations by
third parties, often those who want the child for themselves, are rou-
tinely given significant consideration. 32 Most tellingly, perhaps, is that
lower courts in a handful of cases considered a parent's lack of English
proficiency a sufficient reason to remove a child.133
127 See, e.g., In re B & J, 756 N.W.2d 234, 239-40 (Mich. Ct. App. 2008) (reversing a
Michigan family court's termination of parental rights for erroneously construing the
children's best interests and holding them as a paramount concern).
128 See In re M.M., 587 S.E.2d 825, 832 (Ga. Ct. App 2003) (commenting on a juvenile
court's termination of parental rights based on immigrant status). In other cases, courts
simply ignore the requirement that they make a fitness inquiry and move immediately to
considerations of the child's best interest. See, e.g., Anita C. v. Superior Court, No. B213283,
2009 WL 2859068, at * 5(Cal. Ct. App. Sept. 8, 2009) (finding unfitness irrelevant because
return of [the child] to [the] mother would be detrimental to him").
129 See Anita C., 2009 WL 2859068 at *5; In re M.M., 587 S.E.2d at 832.
1so See, e.g., In re M.M., 587 S.E.2d at 832.
131 See, e.g., In re M.M., 587 S.E.2d at 827.
132 See Vivi Abrams, Fuller Says DHR Workes Removed Baby, BIRMINGHAM NEWS, Oct. 25,
2003, at 13A (reporting that undocumented immigrant Marta Alonzo's son was placed in
state care by two "community volunteers" who literally took the child from his family); Shaila
Dewan, Two Families, Two Cultures and the Girl Between Them, N.Y. TIMES, May 12, 2005, at A16
(noting that the child's teacher accused the immigrant mother of being unfit and then re-
ceived custody of the child); Omar Riojas, DLA Piper, Counsel for Encarnaci6n Bail Romero,
Address at The Impact of Immigration Policy on Children (Nov. 5, 2009) (describing how an
undocumented mother lost custody of her child after a local teacher's aide offered babysit-
ting services and then refused to return the child) (remarks on file with author).
15s See Tim Padgett & Dolly Mascarelias, Can a Mother Lose Her Child Because She Doesn't
Speak English?, TIME (Aug. 27, 2009), available at http://www.time.com/time/nation/
article/0,8599,1918941,00.html. English proficiency is not a requirement for custody. See
Zuniga v. Ponce, No. I CA-CV 08-0615, 2009 WL 4251630, at *4 (Ariz. Ct. App. Nov. 27,
2009) ("There is no requirement for a parent to speak English in order to have custody of
his or her child."). Consequently, it should comes as no surprise that the majority of these
decisions have been overturned on appeal. See, e.g., In re B &J, 756 N.W.2d at 237; In re
Angelica L., 767 N.W.2d 74, 80 (Neb. 2009); infra notes 255-266 and accompanying text.
However, the likelihood of appeal in undocumented immigrant termination cases is low.
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For example, the Mississippi Department of Human Services inves-
tigated an undocumented immigrant mother, Cirila Baltazar Cruz, after
she gave birth to her daughter.134 The Department immediately re-
moved the child, finding that Cruz's lack of English proficiency "placed
her unborn child in danger and will place the baby in danger in the ft-
ture."135 In a similar instance in Tennessee, the teacher of an immigrant
mother's child accused the mother of neglect and urged officials to re-
move the child.136 On review, a Tennessee court agreed, basing its deci-
sion on the mother's lack of English proficiency.137 The court then pro-
hibited contact with the daughter until the mother demonstrated her
"commitment to her daughter" by learning to speak English.138 Finally,
in South Carolina, state authorities removed a child from her undocu-
mented parents because the police mistook their indigenous dialect for
slurred Spanish and charged them with public intoxication.139
B. judicial Unfitness Determinations at the Juvenile Court Level
Undocumented immigrant parental rights termination decisions
mirror the presumptions underlying the initial removals.14o These deci-
sions are often based on nothing more than a parent's immigration
status and again reveal a primary concern for the best interest of the
child rather than parental rights.141 For example, in In re Angelica L., the
state of Nebraska removed an undocumented immigrant mother's chil-
dren after receiving allegations of neglect.142 The mother, a native of
Guatemala named Maria Luis, entered the United States without proper
134 See Padgett & Mascareiias, supra note 133.
135 Id.
13 6 Dewan, supra note 132.
37 Id.
s
38 Id. In fact, the court made no accommodations for the mother's lack of English profi-
ciency. The mother, Felipa, spoke only an indigenous dialect called Mixtecan, but no Mix-
tecan translators were provided during the initial custody hearing. Id. Consequently, the
mother could not defend herself against the charges of neglect. See id. When later asked how
learning English would make Filipa a better mother, the judge replied, "It's common sense."
Id. Though this case did not involve an undocumented immigrant, it nonetheless demon-
strates that the acceptability of these biases is growing.
139 Interview with Patricia Ravenhorst, Exec. Dir., S.C. Immigrant Victim's Network (Oct
22, 2009). The child's babysitter, a woman who openly acknowledged her desire to gain cus-
tody of Martin and Lucia's daughter, provided the initial information regarding the parents'
intoxication to the police. Id. Immediately after the couple's child entered into state custody,
the babysitter requested custody of the child. Id.
14o See In re V.S., 548 S.E.2d 490, 492-93 (Ga. Ct. App. 2001); In re Angelica L., 767
N.W.2d at 80.
141 See In re VS., 548 S.E.2d at 492-93; In re Angelica L., 767 N.W.2d at 80.
142 In re Angelica L., 767 N.W.2d at 81-82.
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documentation in 1997.143 Her son Daniel was born in 1998 and her
daughter Angelica was born in 2004.144 Angelica was born prematurely
and, when she was one month old, her mother took her to the hospital
where she was diagnosed as "suffering from dehydration, malnutrition, a
urinary tract infection, and a left pulmonary branch stenosis."145
After Angelica's illness, Luis recognized she needed guidance and
sought the assistance of Healthy Starts, a federal and state funded social
services program that provides parents with child care information and
assistance."* After Luis became involved in the Healthy Starts program,
they sent reports to Nebraska DHHS expressing concern for the well
being of Daniel and Angelica.147 The department investigated the re-
ports and determined them unfounded. 148 When Angelica next be-
came ill, an employee from Healthy Starts once again contacted DHHS
alleging abuse. 49 DHHS again determined the claim to be unfounded,
but the report nevertheless triggered an investigation and, as a result of
this investigation, DHHS determined Luis to be unfit.150
The juvenile court held that the state had proved her unfitness
based on the fact that she "either A) embarked on an unauthorized trip
to the United States with a newborn premature infant or B) gave birth
to a premature infant in the United States" after entering the country
illegally.151 Without deciding between the two, the trial court held that
either scenario demonstrated "that [Luis] did not provide the basic
level of prenatal and postnatal care." 152 According to the trial court,
143 Id. at 80.
4 Id.
145 Id. at 80-81. At the hospital, the doctor became aware of Maria's immigration status
and threatened to recommend deportation if Maria did not follow her instructions or
follow up on Angelica's medical care. Id. at 81.
146 Id. at 81.
147 In re Angelica L., 767 N.W.2d at 81.
14s Id.49 Id.
15o See id. at 81-82 (noting that these "allegations [of abuse] were never substantiated and
were deemed to be unfounded"). Although the allegations were unfounded, the Nebraska
DHHS removed the children after police arrested Maria for obstructing a government inves-
tigation. Id. at 82. They charged Maria with misidentifying herself as the children's babysit-
ter-rather than their mother-when the child welfare workers came to investigate the alle-
gations of abuse. Id. at 81-82. After her obstruction arrest, Immigration and Customs
Enforcement (ICE) officials took Maria into custody and scheduled her for deportation. Id.
at 82.
151 Id. at 87-88 (internal quotation marks omitted).
152 In re Angelica L., 767 N.W.2d at 88 (internal quotation marks omitted).
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good mothers do not illegally cross the border if they are pregnant or
have just given birth.15 3
Other courts use similar immigration violations to justify findings
of unfitness. 15 4 In In re VS., the Georgia Department of Family and
Children Services (DFCS) removed the daughter of an undocumented
father shortly after birth when both she and her mother tested positive
for cocaine. 155 The mother was addicted to drugs but the undocu-
mented father never used drugs and had attempted to prevent the
mother's drug use during pregnancy.15 6 After the Georgia DFCS took
custody of V.S., the father tried to visit but DFCS employees claimed
that he needed an appointment and turned him away. 157 He had called
repeatedly to set up appointments and, though DFCS had his name
and contact information, the Department did not contact him or re-
turn his calls.15B Only months later did DFCS permit him to see his
daughter for one hour every fifteen days.159 He kept each of his ap-
pointments, showed affection, and "seemed to genuinely love V.S."160
Nevertheless, the juvenile court deemed him unfit, in part because he
"is an illegal alien and is subject to deportation."1 61
Other cases are comparable.162 In In re M.M., a Georgia juvenile
court found a father unfit and terminated his parental rights essentially
due to his status as an undocumented immigrant and its concern about
the "possibility that the father could someday be deported."163 In addi-
tion, the juvenile court terminated the mother's rights based in part on
her relationship with a man "who was an illegal alien. "164 Finally, in In re
1ss See id. at 87-88.
154 See In re VS., 548 S.E.2d at 492-93.
155 Id. at 492. He asked to pay child support but was told he would not be allowed to do
so until a court hearing. Id. Georgia DFCS never created a reunification plan for the fa-
ther. Id. When V.S. was 7 months old, the state petitioned to terminate both the mother
and father's parental rights. Id. at 493.
156 Id. at 492. The relationship began as one for money but turned into a romantic re-
lationship. Id. The father and mother moved in together and the mother became preg-
nant. Id. The father gave her money for prenatal care and asked her to marry him. Id. She
refused. Id. The father eventually moved out. Id.
157 Id.
158 Id.
159 In re VS., 548 S.E.2d at 492.
16o Id.
161 Id. at 493.
162 See In re M.M., 587 S.E.2d at 829, 831-32; In re B &J, 756 N.W.2d at 238.
163 In re M.M., 587 S.E.2d at 832. In this case, the father was an undocumented immi-
grant but not in deportation proceedings. See id. at 831. Nevertheless, the court clearly had
a "problem with [the father's] INS situation." Id.
164 Id. at 829.
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B & J, a Michigan family court found two parents unfit, stating that
they had been deported and thus "were unable to provide proper care
and custody for the children." 165
Under the law, a parent's undocumented status, by itself, is not
enough to support an unfitness determination.16 6 The above cases,
however, demonstrate that such terminations occur nonetheless.167
These decisions indicate that in undocumented immigrant parental
rights terminations cases, trial courts are discarding the parental rights
standard and employing a best interest of the child standard instead.
IV. IMMIGRANT PARENTS' POST-DEPORTATION CIRCUMSTANCES
Given the state of the law, which maintains that parents must be
found unfit before termination is appropriate, a finding of unfitness
based on immigration status alone is inappropriate. 16 8 Nevertheless,
some courts based their fitness determinations of immigrant status on
what they believe is the best interest of the child.169 The choice to ele-
vate best interest considerations over parental rights explains the lack
of sympathy courts and agencies demonstrate for the parents' post-
deportation circumstances. It also helps explain why courts and agen-
cies believe that even outright interference with these parents' attempts
at achieving reunification is justified.
A. No Consideration ofDeportee's Post-Deportation Circumstances
Courts are tremendously unwilling to consider difficulties that an
undocumented or deported parent might experience when trying to
comply with the requirements of a reunification plan.170 For example,
Anita C. v. Superior Court--where a mother unsuccessfully attempted to
take parenting classes after being deported to Guatemala-demon-
strates one court's lack of sympathy for the difficulties that undocu-
mented immigrant parents encounter when trying to comply with re-
165 In reB &J, 756 N.W.2d at 238.
16s See In re VS., 548 S.E.2d at 493-94.
167 See In re M.M., 587 S.E.2d at 829, 831-32; In re B &J, 756 N.W.2d at 238. Although
some of these terminations are reversed on appeal, most such cases never get appealed.
See, e.g., In re B &J, 756 N.W.2d at 237; In re Angelica L., 767 N.W.2d at 80; infra notes 251-
266 and accompanying text.
16s See it re V.S., 548 S.E.2d 490, 493-94 (Ga. Ct. App. 2001).
169 See Anita C. v. Superior Court, No. B213283, 2009 WL 2859068, at *8-9 (Cal. Ct.
App. Sept. 8, 2009).
170 See id.
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unification plans in a foreign country.'71 This lack of sympathy shows
that the primary concern of the court is achieving what it perceives as
the child's best interest.72
Similarly, in In re Angelica L., a Nebraska juvenile court held that
the mother's "fear of deportation serves as no excuse for her failure to
provide the minimum level of health care to her children."173 It simi-
larly found that her undocumented status did not excuse her failure to
remedy the conditions that led to the initial finding of unfitness. 74 Ac-
cording to the court, "[b] eing in the status of an undocumen ted immi-
grant is, no doubt, fraught with peril and this [inability to satisfy the
reunification plan] would appear to be an example of that fact."' 75
In Anita C. v. Superior Court, the court held that the lack of re-
sources available to the deported mother in her home country did not
excuse her inability to comply with her reunification plan, which re-
quired her to take specific parenting classes. 76 The California Court of
Appeal dismissed the mother's explanation that the required classes
were not taught in Guatemala.'77 It affirmed the juvenile court's recog-
nition that the mother's ability to comply with the reunification plan
was limited by the resources available to her but blamed her for this
situation, stating that "we may also consider that mother [through de-
portation] placed herself out of reach of many of the services ... [the
state] could have provided." 78 Consequently, the Court of Appeal held
that "due to [these] circumstances, mother could not adequately ad-
dress the issues that led to her losing custody of the children," and
171 See id.
172 See id. at *9.
173 In re Angelica L., 767 N.W.2d. 74, 88 (Neb. 2009) (internal quotation marks omit-
ted).
174 See id.
175 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
176 See Anita C., 2009 WL 2859068, at *2, *8. In Anita C., child welfare officials removed
the childJ.A., from his home after Anita left him unattended while at work. Id. at * 1. The
state later charged her with, and she pled guilty to, child endangerment. Id. ICE officials
then deported her. Id. The case initially concerned three older half siblings, but the court
terminated jurisdiction over their cases when they returned to their father's custody. Id. at
*2 n.5.
177 Id. at *8.
178 Id. at *7. The court also blamed the mother for the failure of the international
home study to be completed. Id. During the time the home study was to have been con-
ducted the mother attempted to illegally re-enter the United States, presumably in a des-
perate attempt to reunify with her child. See id. at *4.
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agreed with the juvenile court, that this is simply "a sad consequence of
illegal immigration."179
B. Deportation as Abandonment
In other cases, the courts' lack of sympathy for the difficulties faced
by undocumented immigrant parents manifests as a willingness to treat
their deportation as abandonment.86 Perez-Velasquez v. Culpeper County
Department of Social Services involved an undocumented immigrant
mother and father with three young, U.S. citizen children.' 8 ' The state
took custody of the children after a social worker visited the home and
found the mother had left them unsupervised when she went for a job
interview.'82 The father was incarcerated at the time his children were
taken into custody and he was deported immediately after his release
from prison. 83 Shortly thereafter, a Virginia court terminated both par-
ents' parental rights and the children became eligible for adoption.&
With regard to the father, the court found him unfit because he
had, "without good cause, failed to maintain continuing contact with
and to provide or substantially plan for the future of the [children] for
a period of six months after the child's placement in foster care. . . ."18
The father challenged the decision, arguing that his failure to maintain
contact with his children was because of his incarceration and deporta-
tion, and consequently, was not willful.' 86 The court found this explana-
tion irrelevant, however, stating that it was the "father's own actions
179 Id. at *5, *8; see also E-mail from Hilda Lopez, Attorney, to author (Apr. 5, 2010) (on
file with author) (describing an unpublished case from Massachusetts in which a juvenile
court held that, because the deported mother could not come to the United States to re-
gain custody, the state Department of Children and Family Services had no responsibility
to make reasonable efforts at reunification).
18o See Perez-Velasquez v. Culpeper Cnty. Dep't of Soc. Servs., No. 0360-09-4, 2009 WL
1851017, at *2 (Va. Ct. App. June 30, 2009).
181 Id. at *1. See also In re M.A.P.A., No. 98-1218, 1999 WL 711447, at *2 (Iowa Ct. App.
July 23, 1999) (finding termination of an undocumented immigrant father's parental
rights justified based on the fact that he was in prison and, once released, would be likely
be deported and not "have sufficient time to develop a relationship with" his son).
182 Perez-Velasquez, 2009 WL 1851017, at *1.
1 Id.
184 Id. at *1, *3.
185 Id. at *2 n.1, *3. The father admitted he had no contact with his children during
this period but argued that child welfare services never told him where the children were
and that such contact would have been difficult because the children spoke English and he
spoke primarily Main and Spanish. Id. at *2.
186 Id.
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[that] led to this situation."187 In addition, the court was horrified by
the father's reunification plan, which was to return to the United States
illegally and take the children back with him.188
Similarly, in the case of Encarnaci6n Bail Romero, a Missouri cir-
cuit court found that Bail Romero, an undocumented immigrant
mother incarcerated after providing false identification papers during
an Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) workplace raid, had
abandoned her son.18 Although Bail Romero's separation from her
son was involuntary, the trial court still held that her actions constituted
abandonment.190 Finally, in In re VS., a Georgia juvenile court used the
difficulties the undocumented father encountered when trying to visit
his daughter as grounds for abandonment.91 The court held that the
father "has failed for more than one year to develop and maintain a
parental bond with the child; he has not provided any financial support
to the child [and] he only began visiting the child when she was nine
months old."l 9 2 These statements, however, directly contradict the facts
187 See Perez-Velasquez, 2009 WL 1851017, at *2. Although the court noted that incar-
ceration by itself does not justify termination of parental rights, the court held that termi-
nation is permissible when incarceration is "combined with other evidence concerning the
parent/child relationship." Id. Other evidence included the father's immigration status.
See id. As noted by the trial court and upheld on appeal, the father's deportation
eliminated any chance that he could maintain contact with the children and
be involved in the foster care plan during the time period after the children's
placement in foster care, or that he could participate in remedying, within a
reasonable time, the conditions resulting in the placement and continuation
of the children in foster care.
Id.
188 See id. As a convicted felon, any return to the United States would have been illegal;
thus, the court found "[t]his plan was not viable, and it was not in the best interests of the
children." See id.
189 In re C.M.B.R., 332 S.W.3d 793, 801-02, 804 (Mo. 2011) (en banc). Although offi-
cials released other parents, Bail Romero was ineligible for release because she had used
false identification. Thompson, supra note 10. "Such charges were part of a crackdown by
the Bush administration, which punished illegal immigrants by forcing them to serve out
sentences before being deported." Id. After Bail Romero's conviction, the Supreme Court
in Flores-Figueroa v. United States, struck down a conviction under a law criminalizing aggra-
vated identity theft. See 129 S. Ct. 1886, 1894 (2009). According to the Supreme Court,
there must be intent and, consequently, this means that Bail Romero's separation from her
child was unnecessary and unjustified. See id.; In re C.M.B.R., 332 S.W.3d at 804.
'9 In re C.M.B.R., 332 S.W.3d at 816-18.
191 See In re VS., 548 S.E.2d at 493.
192 Id. The juvenile court also provided additional reasons such as
he failed to contact DFCS and went to Mexico without notifying anyone con-
nected with this proceeding; he failed to respond to a certified letter from
DFCS; he got the child's mother pregnant knowing she had a drug problem;
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of the case, which demonstrate that he had bonded with his child, at-
tempted to pay child support, and actively sought visitation since her
birth.193
C. Immigration Law
A court's ability to ignore an immigrant parent's post-deportation
circumstances or view deportation as abandonment is reinforced by the
harsh immigration laws on illegal reentry.194 In 1996, Congress sought
to reduce the incidence of illegal immigration and passed the Illegal
Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRIRA).195
One of the consequences of IIRIRA was increased penalties for illegal
reentry after deportation.196 In the context of immigrant parent termi-
nations, this means that once a parent is deported, he or she is barred
from returning to contest termination.197 An undocumented parent
who attempts illegal reentry risks arrest and his or her reasons for reen-
try receive no consideration.198 As a result, deported parents can rarely
he did nothing to stop the mother from abusing drugs; he has failed to ob-
tain permanent employment with benefits; he has failed to obtain basic child
care items, such as a car seat; and he does not have his own place to live.
Id.
193 See id. at 492-93 ("In this case, the evidence shows that the father made numerous
attempts to contact DFCS in order to visit his daughter, asked if he could pay child sup-
port, gave the child's mother money for prenatal care, arranged for and kept his visitation
appointments for the five-month period preceding the hearing, showed love and affection
toward V.S. during visitation, and made arrangements for caring for the child should he be
given custody.").
194 See Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 § 334,
Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009-548, 3009-635 (1996).
195 110 Stat. at 3009-635; see Perez-Velasquez, 2009 WL 1851017, at *3; Statement on Sign-
ing the Omnibus Consolidated Appropriations Act, 1997, 2 PUB. PAPERS 1729, 1731 (Sept.
30, 1996) ("[The bill] also includes landmark immigration reform legislation that builds
on our progress of the last 3 years. It strengthens the rule of law by cracking down on ille-
gal immigration at the border, in the workplace, and in the criminal justice system-
without punishing those living in the United States legally.").
1e6 See 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a) (2006); 110 Stat. at 3009-635.
197 See United States v. Hernandez-Baide, 392 F.3d 1153, 1158 (10th Cir. 2004), rev'd on
other grounds, 544 U.S. 1015 (2005).
198 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a), (b) (2) (making reentry by a deported felon illegal); see Hernan-
dez-Baide, 392 F.3d at 1158. Obviously not all deported parents have felony convictions, but
after the new, stricter immigration controls, more undocumented immigrants are facing
criminal charges and incarceration before deportation. See, e.g., United States v. Saucedo-
Patino, 358 F.3d 790, 791 (11th Cir. 2004); United States v. Dyck, 334 F.3d 736, 737 (8th
Cir. 2003); United States v. Carrasco, 313 F.3d 750, 753 (2d Cir. 2002).
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return, thereby increasing the ability of courts to treat deportation as
abandonment.199
The case of United States v. Hernandez-Baide is illustrative.200 Officials
arrested Arlette Hernadez-Baide, a deported immigrant mother, for
criminal reentry when she returned to the United States to contest the
termination of her parental rights and the subsequent adoption of her
daughter.201 A district court judge sentenced her "to twenty-four months
imprisonment followed by three years [of] supervised release."202 She
challenged the sentence, arguing that the court should have applied a
downward departure-a sentence below the statutory minimum-based
on mitigating circumstances concerning a lesser harm. 20 s Specifically, on
appeal to the Tenth Circuit, she argued that the district court should
have considered the fact that she returned to the United States only to
prevent termination of her parental rights and the adoption of her
daughter.204 The district court, however, denied her request for a down-
ward departure and the Tenth Circuit affirmed.205 The appeals court
explained that Congress intended to make reentry a strict liability
crime, and thus, a deported alien who makes an unauthorized reentry is
'strictly liable' for such criminal conduct, regardless of the underlying
motivation for such illegal entry."206
This conclusion has been consistently upheld.207 A parent attempt-
ing illegal reentry to contest termination of parental rights is entitled to
199 See, e.g., Saucedo-Patino, 358 F.3d at 794-95; Dyck, 334 F.3d at 741-42; Carrasco, 313
F.3d at 755-56; Anita C., 2009 WL 2859068, at *8 (deported mother attempted illegal reen-
try to contest termination of her parental rights and adoption of her child).
2oo 392 F.3d at 1155, 1158; see also Saucedo-Patino, 358 F.3d at 794-95; Dyck, 334 F.3d at
741-42; Carrasco, 313 F.3d at 755-56; Anita C., 2009 WL 2859068, at *4, *8.
201 Hernandez-Baide, 392 F.3d at 1154-55.
202 Id. at 1155.
2 Id.; see infra note 207 and accompanying text (discussing the impact of United States
v. Booker).
204 Id.
205 Id. at 1156. On appeal, the government argued that a lesser harm departure was
not appropriate because "no connection exists between the crime of illegal reentry and
the perceived harm, which in this case involved severance of her parental rights." Id. Al-
though the court did not use this as the basis for its decision, this argument reveals the
government's belief that deportation does not affect a parent's ability to reunite with his or
her child.
206 Id. at 1158 (explaining that the statute "'is designed to deter deported aliens from
illegally reentering for any reason,' thereby making 'a deported alien's unauthorized pres-
ence in the United States a crime in itself") (quoting Carrasco, 313 F.3d at 755).
207 See, e.g., Saucedo-Patino, 358 F.3d at 794-95; Dyck, 334 F.3d at 741-42; Carrasco, 313
F.3d at 755-56. The Tenth Circuit decided Hernadez-Baide before the Supreme Court's
decision in United States v. Booker, where the Court held that sentencing guidelines must be
construed as advisory rather than mandatory. United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 245
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no leniency.208 The penalties for illegal reentry are significant and the
immigrant's motivations are irrelevant.209 Consequently, once parents
are deported, it is very unlikely they will be able to return to contest the
termination of their parental rights. 210
(2005). As a result, the Court remanded the case but the Tenth Circuit subsequently rein-
stated its conviction. United States v. Hernadez-Baide, 146 F. App'x 302, 304 (10th Cir.
2005); see also United States v. Mendez-Magana, 102 F. App'x 590, 591 (9th Cir. 2004)
(demonstrating that, even post-Booker, downward departures for family circumstances are
still not permissible).
208 See Hernandez-Baide, 392 F.3d at 1154-55.
20 See, e.g., United States v. Portillo-Alvarez, 223 F. App'x 821, 823 n.2 (10th Cir. 2007)
(holding that "this court has specifically held that § 5K2.11 departures are not allowed in
illegal reentry cases because the crime of illegal reentry is not a specific intent crime");
United States v. Prado-Jimenez, 223 F. App'x 818, 820 n.4 (10th Cir. 2007) (stating in dicta
that "based on the analysis of departures in Hernandez-Baide ... it would be likewise im-
proper for a district court to vary from the advisory guidelines range based solely on the
defendant's motivation for reentering the United States"); United States v. Barajas-Garcia,
229 F. App'x 737, 741 (10th Cir. 2007) (stating "the criminal conduct of illegal reentry
under which Mr. Barajas-Garcia was convicted, requires no specific motive or intent," and
thus the father's purpose for reentry-to protect his infant son from his drug addicted
mother-could not be considered); United States v. Herrera-Gonzalez, No. CR 07-1602JB,
2008 WL 2371564, at *9 (D.N.M. Feb. 6, 2008); United States v. Marinaro, No. CR-03-80-B-
W, 2005 WL 851334, at *10 (D. Me. April 13, 2005) (holding illegal reentry is a crime
without a mens rea element).
210 See Hernandez-Baide, 392 F.3d at 1154-55. Although immigrants often seek visas,
such visas are commonly denied. See, e.g., Adegbuji v. Middlesex Cnty., 347 F. App'x 877,
879-80, 882 (3d Cir. 2009) (holding that a district court did not abuse its discretion when
finding that multiple denials for a visa to reenter the country to attend trial did not war-
rant continuance); Ordoilez v. Tacuri, No. 09-CV-1571 (FB), 2009 WL 2928903, at *1 n.1
(E.D.N.Y Sept. 10, 2009) (noting that immigration officials denied a temporary visa to a
mother that wished to attend a hearing in which she sought the return of her abducted
son). One solution to this dilemma would be to make reentry for such purposes easier to
obtain. The concerns posed by these cases, however, make this result unlikely. See Portillo-
Alvarez, 223 F. App'x at 823 n.2; Prado-Jimenez, 223 F. App'x at 820 n.4; Barajas-Garcia, 229 F.
App'x at 741; Herrera-Gonzalez, 2008 WL 2371564, at *9; Marinaro, 2005 WL 851334, at *10.
After a person has entered the country illegally, and particularly when he or she has com-
mitted a crime after unauthorized entry, the assumption is that the person is untrust-
worthy and the risk that they will overstay their visas is too great. See Portillo-Alvarez, 223 F.
App'x at 823 n.2; Prado-Jimenez, 223 F. App'x at 820 n.4; Barajas-Garcia, 229 F. App'x at 741;
Herrera-Gonzalez, 2008 WL 2371564, at *9; Marinaro, 2005 WL 851334, at *10. The likeli-
hood of permanent separation is also increased by the fact that many children are placed
in English-speaking homes and lose the ability to communicate with their parents. Appell,
supra note 126, at 771. Moreover, "federal law does not specifically require that children be
placed in foster homes where their native or their parents' native language is spoken,"
which shows that maintenance of language skills and ability to speak with natural parents
are viewed as unimportant. See id. (noting that "72% of children in immigrant families
speak a language other than English at home, and in 26% of these homes, nobody four-
teen or older has a strong command of the English language").
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D. State Actions
In cases like In re Angelica L. and Anita C., courts demonstrate the
belief that the primary consideration in parental rights termination
cases should be the best interest of the immigrant child. Courts, how-
ever, did not reach this conclusion alone. In many instances, the actions
of state child welfare agencies were instrumental in achieving termina-
tion.211 In numerous cases, state child welfare agencies did not simply
remove children, they also created the grounds for termination.212 It is
not uncommon for state child welfare agencies to withhold assistance,
tell lies, and even contact immigration authorities if they believe such
actions will ensure the termination of an immigrant parent's rights.213
For example, agencies are often highly resistant to providing re-
unification assistance to undocumented parents. 214 Even when reunifi-
cation is the stated goal and courts order reunification services, the ef-
fort expended by assigned caseworkers is frequently minimal or non-
existent.215 Again, In re Angelica L. is illustrative. 216 First, the Spanish
speaking mother received a non-Spanish speaking case worker.217 Then,
the caseworker gave her no contact information for her children and
neglected to provide her with a physical copy of her case plan.2 18 Fi-
nally, when the mother requested help complying with her case plan,
the caseworker told her she would "'have to take initiative for that' her-
self."219 Similarly, in In re B &J, the caseworker's assistance in finding
services for the parents consisted of a single phone call and an internet
search.220 In addition, the caseworker made no effort to contact the
parents after losing touch with them and refused to ask the child how
to reach the parents because she "had not wanted to upset him."22 1
211 See, e.g., In re B & J, 756 N.W.2d 234, 240 (Mich. Ct. App. 2008); Angelica L., 767
N.W.2d at 95.
212 See, e.g., In reB &J 756 N.W.2d at 237.
213 See, e.g., id. at 240; Angelica L., 767 N.W.2d at 95.
214 See, e.g., In reB &j 756 N.W.2d at 240; Angelica L., 767 N.W.2d at 95.
215 See Angelica L., 767 N.W.2d at 83, 95.
216 See id.
217 Id. at 83.
2 8 Id. at 83-84.
219 Id. at 84.
220 In re B &, 756 N.W.2d at 238.
221 Id.; see also Fairfax Cnty. Dep't of Family Servs. v. Ibrahim, No. 0821-00-4, 2000 WL
1847638, at *1 (Va. Ct. App. Dec. 19, 2000) (noting that the state argued that "rendering
little or no service to the father amounted to rendering reasonable services because it
could not offer services during [the father's] incarceration .. .. " and, according to the
agency, "it had no way to provide services in Ghana") Specifically,
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In other cases, agency employees actually lied to achieve the ter-
mination of an undocumented immigrant's parental rights. 222 For ex-
ample, the Commissioner of the Alabama Department of Human Re-
sources lied in numerous public statements about the danger that
continued custody by Marta Alonzo, an undocumented immigrant
teenage mother, posed to her son, Javier.223 According to the Commis-
sioner, the child had scabies and removal "saved his life."2 24 He openly
stated that "[there's no question but that he was in imminent dan-
ger."2 25 These statements were untrue. 226 In fact, the child's doctor pub-
licly disputed this testimony, stating that Alonzo was a fit parent who
sought medical treatment and never placed her child in danger.227
Likewise, in In re Angelica L., a foreign home-study was conducted,
which concluded that Luis was "able to provide a very stable life to her
family . ... [and] has a reputation in town as being an excellent
mother."228 However, because this was not the conclusion the state
wanted, Nebraska DHHS requested a second report that "was a little
more neutral."229
the department failed to maintain contact with the father or to provide him
with any services. It did not keep the father abreast of [his child's] condition
or residence, nor did it advise him of the children's new foster care case-
worker .... The children's guardian ad litem did not send him an introduc-
tory letter, and the children's therapist never addressed reunification with
their father .... [T]he department never evaluated him, assisted in his transi-
tion from incarceration, or investigated the possibility of coordinating efforts
with an agency in Africa .... [Tihe department's expectation that the father
contact the department [was] unreasonable because he did not know who
was working with the children.
Id. at *3.
222 See Abrams, supra note 132.
2 Id. Much about Javier's removal is suspicious. When the Alabama Department of
Human Resources became involved, rather than return the child and express shock at the
women's actions, the Department supported the removal and said that returning to the
home was a health hazard. See id.; Rosemary Pennington, Fighting for Javier, WBHM BIR-
MINGHAM (Feb. 6, 2004), http://www.wbhm.org/News/2004/Fighting-forJavier.html.
224 Abrams, supra note 132.
225 Id. (adding that the baby was "in such bad shape from neglect" that after removal
he needed to be admitted to the hospital).
226 Id.
227 See id.
228 In reAngelica L., 767 N.W.2d at 87 (internal quotation marks omitted).
229 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted); see also In re M.M., 587 S.E.2d 825, 832 (Ga.
Ct. App. 2003) (noting that, contrary to the state's assertion that the father "never com-
pleted the anger management course[,] .... not only did the father attend a majority of
the sessions of an anger management course, it appears that he has maintained a lifestyle
free of domestic violence" and also exposing other conflicting statements by the state
about the father's parental bond, housekeeping, and permanent residence); E-mail from
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The above examples are telling, but the most shocking illustration
of how state child welfare agencies have interfered and influenced ter-
mination decisions are cases in which welfare workers alerted ICE offi-
cials to a parent's undocumented status to make termination easier.230
Agencies are well aware that, after a child is removed, a parent's subse-
quent deportation makes future reunification unlikely and termination
almost inevitable.231 Consequently, parental deportation after removal
is one of the most effective means of achieving termination of an im-
migrant parent's rights and state agencies have taken advantage of this
fact.
The deportation of Karen Arriaga is illuminating on this point.2 3 2
Arriaga was an undocumented teenage mother of two whose children
were removed by the Florida Department of Children and Families
(DCF) based on questionable charges of neglect.23 3 After Arriaga's
children were taken into protective custody, members of Family Preser-
vation, a welfare group under contract with the Florida DCF told Ar-
riaga that she should go to their office for a supervised visit with her
children.234 When she arrived at the facility, ICE officers were waiting to
take her into custody235 A week later, Arriaga's parents received a simi-
lar call.236 They, too, reported to the Family Preservation office to visit
Hilda Lopez, supra note 179 (describing how the Massachusetts Department of Family
Services "would not contact the Dominican Republic consulate or complete an interna-
tional home study," and that "after a home study was completed by the appropriate protec-
tive agency in the Dominican Republic pursuant to a request by Mother and Mother's
counsel, the Juvenile CourtJudge failed to recognize it").
230 See In re B &J, 756 N.W.2d at 237-38; Aisling Swift, Bonita Mom Gets Probation in Ne-
glect Case, NAPLES DAILY NEWS (Aug. 18, 2009), http://www.naplesnews.com/news/2009/
aug/18 /bonita-mom-gets-probation-neglect-case.
231 See, e.g., Anita C., 2009 WL 2859068 at *8 (showing that reunification after deporta-
tion is all but impossible because the mother would never be able to demonstrate her abil-
ity to provide proper care); In reB &J, 756 N.W.2d at 242 (describing deportation as a "de
facto termination of parental rights"); In re Angelica L., 767 N.W.2d at 82-83 (noting that
the lower court refused immediate reunification "because Maria had been deported to
Guatemala"); Swift, supra note 230 (noting that deportation will prevent the mother from
completing her probation and, with no means of completing her probation, reunification
is unlikely).
232 Swift, supra note 230.
233 See id. The neglect charge stemmed from her inability to afford the medical care for
her premature infant and her lack of transportation to get the child to her medical ap-
pointments. Id.
234 See id.
23 Id.
236Id
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with their grandchildren. 237 As Arriaga's mother held her grandchil-
dren, ICE officers arrived.238
State actors arranged the deportation of the parents in In re B &J
in a similar manner.239 There, a judge ordered the state Department of
Human Services (DHS) to provide reunification services to the un-
documented immigrant family.240 DHS objected to reunification and
requested termination.241 After the family court denied this request,
DHS reported the parents to ICE officials, who then deported the par-
ents.242 After the parents were deported, DHS renewed its petition to
terminate their parental rights and, because the court found deporta-
tion made reunification unlikely, it granted the termination. 243
In assessing the above actions, it is important to recognize that
caseworkers and child welfare agencies have no obligation to report the
immigration status of the families they visit, and mandating such re-
porting is likely unconstitutional. 244 Nevertheless, although such report-
23 Swift, supra note 230.23
a Id.
239 See In re B &J, 756 N.W.2d at 237.
240 Id.
241 Id. at 238 ("The caseworker confirmed that she believed that it had been [DHS's]
intention all along to have respondents deported."). During this period, the services pro-
vided by DHS were meager and intended to subvert reunification. See id. In particular,
DHS repeatedly prevented the children from attending scheduled visits with their parents.
Id.
242 Id. at 237.
243 Id. at 238. The family court found DHS's actions "morally repugnant." Id. (internal
quotation marks omitted). Nevertheless, the family court agreed that the children's best
interests required the termination of their parents' rights. Id. Although the department
had taken no efforts to find any services for the parents in Guatemala and had made no
efforts to contact the respondents, the family court granted the termination petition
merely because the children were in the United States. See id. The caseworker testified that
she "had performed an internet search for possible services in Guatemala" but had "been
unable to find any services" for them. Id.
244 See United States v. Arizona, 703 F. Supp. 2d 980, 987 (D. Ariz. 2010); League of
United Latin Am. Citizens v. Wilson, 908 F. Supp. 755, 786-87 (C.D. Cal. 1995). For exam-
ple, in the 2010 immigration case U.S. v. Arizona, Arizona had passed a law requiring its
police officers to check immigration status under certain circumstances and make war-
rantless arrests if there was probable cause to believe a person removable from the United
States. 703 F. Supp. 2d at 985. The court struck down the law, holding that it was pre-
empted by federal immigration law; thus, only Congress had the power to pass law regard-
ing immigration. Id. at 996. In League of United Latin American Citizens v. Wilson, the federal
district court ruled that most of Proposition 187 was unconstitutional because it consti-
tuted state regulation of immigration. 908 F. Supp. at 786-87. Proposition 187, passed by
California voters, was intended to "provide for cooperation between [the] agencies of state
and local government with the federal government, and to establish a system of required
notification by and between such agencies to prevent illegal aliens in the United States
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ing is not required, it can be effective.245 Reporting a parent's undocu-
mented status increases the likelihood of eventual termination, thus
allowing immigrant children to remain in the United States with the
possibility of being raised as part of an American family.24 For welfare
workers who believe such a result is in a child's best interest, this is a
strong incentive to report undocumented parents to ICE.24 7
from receiving benefits or public services in the State of California." Id. at 763 (internal
quotation marks omitted). The provision would have required any
law enforcement, social services, health care and public education personnel
to (i) verify the immigration status of persons with whom they come in con-
tact; (ii) notify certain defined persons of their immigration status; (iii) re-
port those persons to state and federal officials; and (iv) deny those persons
social services, health care, and education.
Id. The court struck down Proposition 187 as unconstitutional because it required state
officers to determine immigration status, which amounted to unconstitutional state immi-
gration regulation. Id. at 769. According to the Court, state agencies could check the im-
migration status of persons to potentially deny state benefits but they could not "'cooper-
ate' with [federal immigration authorities], solely for the purpose of ensuring that such
persons leave the country." Id. at 771. Clearly, in both Arriaga's story and the case of B &j
the state's cooperation is for just such a purpose. See In re B &J 756 N.W.2d at 237; Swift,
supra note 230. But see Fonseca v. Fong, 84 Cal. Rptr. 3d 567, 579 (Ct. App. 2008) (a differ-
ent California district court held that notification provisions were constitutional because,
unlike Proposition 187, the state did not have to make an independent determination).
The above cases concern the constitutionality of statutes requiring notification, but the
courts have also held that denials of benefits are unconstitutional. See Plyler v. Doe, 457
U.S. 202, 230 (1982). Specifically, in Plyler v. Doe, the Supreme Court held it unconstitu-
tional to deny education to the children of undocumented immigrants. Id. The lower
court in B &Jand the child welfare agency in Arriaga's story both denied undocumented
families state assistance toward reunification-benefits just as important as the educational
benefits at issue in Plyler. See id. at 202; In re B &J, 756 N.W.2d at 237; Swift, supra note 230.
245 Rabin, supra note 10, at 140 ("One judge commented that attorneys often report to
him that they have been unable to locate a client in immigration detention. He described,
'[t]here is a certain sense of, "well, it's inevitable what's going to happen." I think that
there's a mentality out there with some of [the attorneys]: "What, is he going to re-
unify?"'") (quoting Interview by Nina Rabin with J6,Judge, in Pima County, Ariz.).
246 See Susan Redden, Carthage Board Conducts Hearing for Teacher, JOPLIN GLOBE (Aug.
14, 2009), http://www.joplinglobe.com/carthage-jasper-county/x1896309960/Carthage-
board-conducts-hearing-for-teacher; Riojas, supra, note 132. Many of these cases contain
legally questionable actions committed by non-state actors. See Redden, supra. For exam-
ple, Bail Romero's son was taken by a local teacher's aide who decided that it was in the
son's best interest to be adopted by a local couple and pressured Bail Romero in jail to
sign the consent for adoption. See Riojas, supra note 132. In June of 2009, the school board
accused the aide of immoral conduct for her part in arranging the adoption of Bail Ro-
mero's son and recommended her termination. See Redden, supra.
247 See, e.g., In re B &J 756 NW.2d at 237. In addition, such views are not limited to
child welfare workers. See, e.g., Rabin, supra note 10, at 138 (describing "'a judge who be-
lieved it was his obligation to ask everyone their legal status and then to report'") (quoting
Interview by Nina Rabin withJ1,Judge, in Pima County, Ariz.).
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E. Appellate Unfitness Decisions
Given the questionable practices and reasoning employed by lower
courts and agencies in these immigrant parent termination cases, it is
not surprising that, when such decisions have reached appellate courts,
they have almost unanimously been overturned.248 It should also be
noted, however, that appeals in undocumented immigrant parental
rights termination cases are unlikely.249 When poor immigrant parents
with no proficiency in English or even Spanish are deported to their
home countries, their ability to pursue appeals is severely curtailed.
Most cases that have been appealed involve parents lucky enough to
have acquired exceptional legal assistance prior to deportation.250
One such example is In re Angelica L., where the lower court's un-
fitness determination was reversed by the Nebraska Supreme Court
which held that this conclusion was unsupported and therefore im-
proper. The Nebraska Supreme Court explained that the mother must
be found unfit before any other considerations could be taken into ac-
count.25 1 The court made clear that Maria did not "forfeit her parental
rights because she was deported" and further added that "[riegardless
of the length of time a child is placed outside the home, it is always the
State's burden to prove by clear and convincing evidence that the par-
ent is unfit."252 In addition, unlike the lower court, the Nebraska Su-
248 See, e.g., In re B &J 756 N.W.2d at 237; In reAngelica L., 767 N.W.2d at 80.
249 Telephone interview with Chris Huck, supra note 10. It is difficult to gauge how
many cases exist that are not appealed because, as termination cases involve children, they
are typically sealed, leaving no record.
250 Id. Two of the most high profile cases, those of Maria Luis and Encarnaci6n Bail
Romero, received significant attention because the mothers had the good fortune to be-
come the pro bono clients of DLA Piper, one of the largest legal service providers in the
world. See Riojas, supra, note 132. Similarly, the cases of Cerila Balthazar Cruz and Felipa
Berrera were taken up by the Southern Poverty Law Center, a nationally recognized civil
rights organization. See Cirila Baltazar Cruz, et al. v. Mississippi Department of Hum. Services, et
al., S. POVERTY L. CENTER, http://www.spicenter.org/get-informed/case-docket/cruz (last
visited Nov. 20, 2011); Immigrant Child Returns to Her Mixteco Family, S. POVERTY L. CENTER,
(June 10, 2005), http://www.spcenter.org/get-informed/news/immigrant-child-returns-
to-her-mixteco-family.
251 In re Angelica L., 767 N.W.2d at 92 ("[T]he interest of parents in the care, custody,
and control of their children is perhaps the oldest of the fundamental liberty interests
recognized by the U.S. Supreme Court. Accordingly, before the State attempts to force a
breakup of a natural family, over the objections of the parents and their children, the State
must prove parental unfitness.").
252 Id. at 92, 94. While the court recognized that deportation can result in a parent's
separation from his or her child, it held that separation does not by itself "demonstrate
parental unfitness." Id. at 92. The court held that separation from one's child for 15 of the
past 22 months (the guideline established under the ASFA) does not demonstrate unfit-
ness. Id. "Instead, the placement of a child outside the home for 15 or more of the most
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preme Court considered the difficulties facing undocumented immi-
grants like Maria; and was willing to consider the possibility that crossing
the border with a newborn "in the belief that they would have a better
life here" might actually demonstrate considerable care and concern for
one's child.253 Consequently, because the court found that "nothing in
the record establishes that Maria is an unfit parent," the court held that
the termination of Maria's parental rights was erroneous. 254
Other appellate reversals reveal similar concerns. 255 In In re VS.,
The Court of Appeals of Georgia reversed the juvenile court's unfitness
determination, finding it improper to base a termination decision on
the fact that the father "is an illegal alien and is subject to deporta-
tion."256 Similarly, in In re B ' , the Supreme Court of Michigan re-
versed the family court's unfitness decision and refused to allow the
parents' deportation to "constitute[] an improper, de facto termination
of respondents' parental rights."257 The court explained that, "to com-
ply with the guarantees of substantive due process, the state must prove
parental unfitness by 'at least clear and convincing evidence' before
terminating a respondent's parental rights."258 The court then found
recent 22 months under § 43-292(7) merely provides a guideline for what would be a rea-
sonable time for parents to rehabilitate themselves to a minimum level of fitness." Id. In
addition, the court noted that "this circumstance would not exist had the State allowed
Maria to take the children with her to Guatemala." Id. at 94. The opinion also notes the
lack of assistance Luis received from the state that made her compliance with the reunifi-
cation plan nearly impossible. In re Angelica L., 767 N.W.2d at 94-96. The case plan in-
cluded requirements such as obtaining employment and suitable housing but also re-
quirements such as attending parenting classes and completing a psychological evaluation.
Id. at 83. Luis never received a copy of the plan, DHHS told her that arranging classes
internationally was too difficult for DHHS, and she would have to take the initiative her-
self. Id. at 84, 95. Furthermore, because of the difficulties posed by her location, DHHS
left it up to Maria to prove compliance with the plan. Id. at 84. Hannah, the social worker
assigned to the case, admitted it was her responsibility to monitor Luis's progress but ad-
mitted "that she could not do so because of Maria's location." Id. at 84. She later deter-
mined that Maria had failed to comply with the case plan. Id.
253 Id. at 93. In addition, the court was also prepared to consider how the fear of de-
portation might have influenced Luis's actions and to find that it excused some of her
parental mistakes. See id.
254 Id.
255 See In re VS., 548 S.E.2d at 494; In re B &J, 756 N.W.2d at 242.
256 See In re VS., 548 S.E.2d at 493.
257 In reB &f, 756 N.W.2d at 241-42. The court recognized that once the parents were
deported, it was "all but certain that respondents would be permanently separated from
their children and that respondents would become unable to provide proper care and
custody." Id. at 242.258 Id. at 241 (quoting Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 748 (1982)).
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that the family court erred in attributing such a showing to the Michi-
gan DHS.259
Even at the appellate level, however, not all cases are reversed.260
When such decisions are affirmed, the appellate courts do so in the
same manner as the lower courts: they ignore the fitness requirement
and focus entirely on the question of the child's best interest.261 For
example, in Perez-Velasquez v. Culpeper County Department of Social Services,
the Virginia Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's holding that the
deported father had, "without good cause, failed to maintain continu-
ing contact with and to provide or substantially plan for the future of
the child[ren] "262 The court further held that it "'is clearly not in the
best interests of a child to spend a lengthy period of time waiting to
find out when, or even if, a parent will be capable of resuming his [or
her] responsibilities."' 263 Similarly, in Anita C., the appellate court
agreed that the child's best interest was the only relevant consideration
and that the mother's fitness was irrelevant.264
These above cases demonstrate the extreme lengths to which some
courts and agencies will go to terminate parental rights in favor of what
they perceive to be the best interest of the child.265 Despite the obvious
intention to do what is good for the child, however, employing a best
interest standard does not guarantee that termination decisions will be
made according to the child's actual best interest.26 6
259 Id. at 242.
260 See, e.g., Anita C., 2009 WL 2859068, at *11; Perez-Velasquez, 2009 WL 1851017, at *4.
261 See Anita C., 2009 WL 2859068, at *9-10; Perez-Velasquez, 2009 WL 1851017, at *2.
262 2009 WL 1851017, at *2 n.1 (quoting VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-283 (2011)).
265 Id. at *2 n.1, *3 (quoting Kaywood v. Halifax Cnty. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 394 S.E.2d
492, 495 (Va. Ct. App. 1990)).
264 See Anita C., 2009 WL 2859068 *-9. Other scholars have noted the assumptions re-
garding the unfitness of African-American families. See, e.g., Dorothy E. Roberts, Is There
Justice in Children's Rights?: The Critique ofFederal Family Preservation Policy, 2 U. PA. J. CONST.
L. 112, 131 (1999) ("Poor black mothers are stereotyped as deviant and uncaring; they are
blamed for transferring a degenerate lifestyle of welfare dependency and crime to their
children. Black fathers are simply thought to be absent.") (internal citations omitted). In
this sense, undocumented parents are treated similarly to other poor, non-white parents.
See, e.g., In re VS., 548 S.E.2d at 493; Roberts, supra, at 131. Yet, as these cases show, immi-
gration status makes such actions more likely and harder to combat. See In re VS., 548
S.E.2d at 493; In re B &J, 756 N.W.2d at 242.
265 See Anita C, 2009 WL 2859068, at *9-10; Perez-Velasquez, 2009 WL 1851017, at *2.
266 See Anita C., 2009 WL 2859068, at *9-10; Perez-Velasquez, 2009 WL 1851017, at *2. As
discussed below, this question has been explored in the context of African-American re-
movals and terminations, and it was in the context of the removal of African-American
children that best interest considerations and the Children's Rights Movement evolved.
Although African-American terminations demonstrate a similar elevation of best interests
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V. BEST INTERESTS AND BETTER PARENTS
The United States has a long history of removal decisions that are,
in hindsight, unwise or even harmful.26 7 Best interest standards are sub-
jective and are susceptible to bias.268 Consequently, even if choosing
children's rights over parental rights will benefit children in theory, this
does not mean they will result in better outcomes in practice. 269
A. Parental Rights vs. Children's Rights
The primary purpose of the parental rights doctrine and the fitness
standard is to ensure parental autonomy in raising children. 270 The
strong protection afforded to parental rights is justified by the belief
that this protection also benefits children and the state.271 The doctrine
contains the following presumptions: (1) children benefit because the
biological parents have strong incentives to take care of their children,
and (2) the state benefits because parental independence from the state
enables them to raise children to be independent citizens equipped
with the ability to make independent personal and political choices. 272
In addition, the parental rights doctrine also incorporates the belief that
independence from state interference guarantees a meaningful right to
privacy by ensuring that many of the most intimate aspects of a persons'
over parental rights, the removals and terminations in the immigrant context are quite
different.
267 See STEPHEN O'CONNOR, ORPHAN TRAINS: THE STORY OF CHARLES LORING BRACE
AND THE CHILDREN HE SAVED AND FAILED 202 (2001); Marcia Zug, Dangerous Gamble: Child
Support, Casino Dividends, and the Fate of the Indian Family, 36 Wm. MITCHELL L. REV. 738,
771-74 (2010).
26 See, e.g., In re V.S., 548 S.E.2d 490, 494 (Ga. Ct. App. 2001); In re B & J, 756 N.W.2d
234, 242 (Mich. Ct. App. 2008).
269 See, e.g., In re VS., 548 S.E.2d at 494; In re B &f, 756 N.W.2d at 242.
270 See Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 753 (1982); see also Bruce A. Boyer & Steven
Lubet, The Kidnapping ofEdgardo Mortara: Contemporary Lessons in the Child Welfare Wars, 45
VILL. L. REV. 245, 253 (2000) (stating that "[c] entral to the Court's decision in Santosky is
its view that any effort to sever the parent-child relationship ... , must begin with an in-
quiry that is parent-focused").
271 See Katherine K. Baker, Bionormativity and the Construction ofParenthood, 42 GA. L. REV.
649, 712 (2008) (discussing the assumptions that children "benefit from strong parental
rights and ... are hurt when a Big Brother state starts dictating parenting practices").
272 Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 602-03 (1979) ("[P]ages of human experience ...
teach that parents generally do act in the child's best interests."); Appell, supra note 35, at
709 (explaining that "it is the parent's role to raise and nurture children to become ma-
ture adults who are able to exercise political choice ... . [and] this role requires a measure
of independence from the state"); see also Mary L. Shanley, Unwed Fathers'Rights, Adoption,
and Sex Equality: Gender-Neutrality and the Perpetuation of Patriarchy, 95 COLUM. L. REv. 60, 85
(1995).
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life remain private.273 However, the assumption that parents will always
act in their children's best interests is problematic. Parental rights can
conflict with children's rights and, in those circumstances, the choice to
protect parental rights may not be in a child's best interest.274
The above termination cases exemplify this dilemma. In these
cases, the courts refused to uphold the parents' rights to the care and
custody of their child, finding that such a decision would not be in that
child's best interest.27 5 Instead, each court viewed termination as pref-
erable.276 The justifications given in these cases for why termination is
in a child's best interest can be broken down into three distinct but re-
lated categories. First, it is not in a child's best interest to move to a for-
eign country he or she may never have visited, where the child may not
speak the language, and where the child may have much more limited
opportunities.277 Second, it is in a child's best interest to remain in
America because it is home, the standard of living is higher, and the
opportunities are better.278 Third, it is in a child's best interest to re-
main in the United States because the child may have become attached
to his or her current caregiver, the caregiver may wish to adopt the
child, and adoption is in the child's best interest because it will enable
the child to become part of an American family.279 These justifications
273 See, e.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578-79 (2003) (extending the zone of pri-
vacy to cover same sex sexual relationships); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 165-66 (1973) (rec-
ognizing a right to abortion); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972) (extending this
right to unmarried couples); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485-86 (1965) (recogniz-
ing the right to privacy in the context of intimate marital relations); Appell, supra note 35, at
708 (noting this right is based on the idea that "family relationships and issues are protected
because families are intimate associations created and controlled by autonomous adults").
Justice Brandeis famously defined the right to privacy as the "right to be let alone." Samuel D.
Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193, 195 (1890).
274 See Anita C. v. Superior Court, No. B213283, 2009 WL 2859068, at *9-10 (Cal. Ct.
App. Sept. 8, 2009); Perez-Velasquez v. Culpeper Cnty. Dep't of Soc. Servs., No. 0360-09-4,
2009 WL 1851017, at *3 (Va. Ct. App. June 30, 2009). For a further discussion of this con-
flict between parental rights and children's and state interests, see Zug, supra note 15, at
1180-82.
275 See Anita C., 2009 WL 2859068, at *9-10; Perez-Velasquez, 2009 WL 1851017, at *3.
276 See Anita C., 2009 WL 2859068, at *9-10; Perez-Velasquez, 2009 WL 1851017, at *3.
277 See Rabin, supra note 10, at 139 ("[The lawyer] went on to describe a case in which
a child would need ongoing medical treatment and the parents were in Agua Prieta. The
judge was very reluctant to return the child to her parents because of concerns about the
availability of care. The attorney recalled, '[w]e were saying that she can get treatment in
Mexico, it's not like medieval Europe. [And the] judge said, "Well, I don't know about
that."'") (quoting Interview by Nina Rabin with A6, Attorney, in Pima County, Ariz.).
278 See Anita C., 2009 WL 2859068, at *9.
279 Shani King, Challenging Monohumanism: An Argument for Changing the Way We Think
About Intercountry Adoption, 30 MICH. J. INT'L L. 413, 439-40 (2009) (describing this as the
"Improved Life Chances Narrative," which "describe[s] the opportunities for adoptive
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frequently overlap, and many termination decisions rely on a combina-
tion of the three.280
For example, in In re Angelica L., the state presented evidence to
demonstrate that "living in Guatemala would put [the children] at a
disadvantage compared to living in the United States." 281 The state
called a clinical psychologist to testify that, "if the children were sent to
Guatemala, they would 'experience culture shock, disorientation, fear-
fulness, sadness and anger.'" 282 He also "testified that the standard of
living in Guatemala is lower than the standard in the United States, the
people are poorer, and there are less economic opportunities."2 83 The
purpose of this testimony was to contrast the life the children would
have in Guatemala with the life the children would have with their fos-
ter family in the United States.28 After hearing this evidence, the trial
court decided that the children should not return to Guatemala and
terminated the mother's parental rights. 285 The court held that because
"neither Angelica nor Daniel [were] familiar with Guatemala," and be-
cause they "were thriving in the only locality they have ever known with
the only parental figures they have ever known," termination was in
their best interests.28 6
children as improved in the United States, and in doing so, implying the superiority of
upper- and middle-class parents to poor birth parents"); see also Rashmi Goel, From Tainted
to Sainted: The View of Interracial Relations as Cultural Evangelism, 2007 Wis. L. REv. 489, 526
(describing the case of Anna Mae He, and explaining that her foster parents, the "Bakers,
were determined to keep Anna Mae, not just because they loved her, but because they
believed that returning her to her biological parents would force her to be Chinese, when
she had the opportunity to be American").
28 See Goel, supm note 279, at 522 (discussing how notions of "foreignness and exoti-
cism" can influence custody decisions and describing the competing interests in these cases
as between "family unity and the desire consistent with the Missionary-Heathen paradigm, to
save children of color").
28 In re Angelica L., 767 N.W.2d 74, 94 (Neb. 2009). Similarly, in Fairfax County De-
partment ofFamily Services v. Ibrahim, the state argued for termination based on the believed
inferiority of the home and services that the father could provide to his children in Ghana.
See No. 0821-00-4, 2000 WL 1847638, at *3 (Va. Ct. App. Dec. 19, 2000). The state made
this argument without offering any "information about the situation in Ghana" and with-
out making any "efforts to determine the conditions there." Id. The state's argument was
simply based on assumptions regarding the inferiority of life in Ghana. See id.
282 In re Angelica L., 767 N.W.2d at 84.
283 Id. at 85. He was, however, unable to answer questions when asked about the educa-
tional and athletic opportunities available in Guatemala. See id.
284 See id.
285 See id. at 87-88.
286 See id. at 88. On appeal the court rejected such considerations, holding that
"whether living in Guatemala or the United States is more comfortable for the children is
not determinative of the children's best interests .... [Tihe 'best interests' of the child
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In Anita C. v. Superior Court, the Los Angeles County Superior Court
found it was in the child's best interest to remain with foster parents be-
cause the foster parents wished to adopt him and could better provide
for him.287 Specifically, the court held that "[t] heir home is virtually the
only one he has ever known and, not surprisingly, he has become ex-
tremely bonded with them."288 Similarly, at Bail Romero's termination
hearing, the Missouri Court of Appeals contrasted the immigrant
mother with the potential adoptive mother.289 The court described Bail
Romero as having little to offer her son Carlos, stating that "[t]he only
certainties in [Mother's] future is that she will remain incarcerated until
next year, and that she will be deported thereafter."2oo The court con-
trasted this bleak future with that of the prospective adoptive parents,
who made a "comfortable living, had rearranged their lives and work
schedules to provide Carlos a stable home, and had support from their
extended family."29' Consequently, the court held it was in Carlos's best
interest to be placed with the adoptive family and terminated Bail Ro-
mero's parental rights.292
standard does not require simply that a determination be made that one environment or
set of circumstances is superior to another." Id. at 94. The court then explained that
unless Maria is found to be unfit, the fact that the state considers certain
adoptive parents, in this case the foster parents, better, or this environment
better, does not overcome the commanding presumption that reuniting the
children with Maria is in their best interests-no matter what country she
lives in. As we have stated, this court has never deprived a parent of the cus-
tody of a child merely because on financial or other grounds a stranger might
better provide.
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
287 See Anita C., 2009 WL 2859068, at *9-10.
28 Id. at *9.
289 See In re C.M.B.R., No. SD 30342, 2010 WL 2841486, at *4 (Mo. Ct. App. July 21,
2010), rev'd 332 S.W.3d 793 (Mo. 2011).
290 Id.
291 Thompson, supra note 10.
292 See In re CM.B.R., 2010 WL 2841486, at *4. The story of Marta Alonzo is also simi-
lar. See Pennington, supra note 223. There, the mother's alleged unfitness was simply a ruse
to separate Alonzo from her child, deport her back to Guatemala, and allow her son to be
adopted by a white, middle class, American family. See id. Before the mother had any
chance to remedy the alleged grounds that led to a finding of unfitness, the child welfare
agency had the adoption paperwork ready. See id.; see also In re M.M., 587 S.E.2d 825, 832
(Ga. Ct. App. 2003) ("The court terminated the father's parental rights[,] ... determining
that the father had done nothing to legalize his residency in the United States, that even if
he later attempted to do so, he would face deportation, that the child could then be re-
turned to protective custody or taken with her father to 'an unknown future in Mexico,'
and that it was unwilling to subject [him] to those possibilities."); In re B &j, 756 N.W.2d
at 241 (revealing the state's argument that termination was in "the children's best interests
because the children will have a better and more prosperous life in the United States than
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These cases exemplify the belief that remaining in the United
States and growing up with a "typical" American family is in the best
interests of immigrant children.293 However, just because these beliefs
are strongly held does not mean they are correct. There is a long his-
tory of prejudice towards immigrant and minority families and the be-
lief in the inferiority of their caregiving.294 This history has demon-
strated that a best interest standard is easily susceptible to cultural and
racial conceptions of what is in a child's best interest.29 5 The separation
of immigrant families may simply be the most recent iteration of this
phenomenon.296
B. Best Interest Considerations and Indian Children
The history of separating Indian children from their parents pro-
vides a compelling example of how biases may influence perceptions
and decisions regarding a child's best interest. The nineteenth century
witnessed many attempts to solve the "Indian problem," typically de-
scribed as the Indian people's failure to accept Anglo-American "civili-
zation."297 By the end of the century, reformers agreed that the best
in Guatemala"); Interview with Linda Brandmiller, Dir. of Immigration Servs., Catholic
Charities Archdiocese of San Antonio (Aug. 13, 2009) (describing a Texas case where the
court refused to return a special needs child to fit parents because the medical services
available in Mexico were considered inadequate and he was doing well with his foster par-
ents).
293 See In re C.M.B.R., 2010 WL 2841486, at *4; Julian et al., supra note 126, at 31. In
fact, this message is so strong it may be influencing immigrant family cases where deporta-
tion is not even an issue. See Appell, supra note 126, at 778. An immigrant, Spanish speak-
ing grandmother-raising a large family and wanting to provide for her newborn grand-
daughter-lost custody in favor of
the Whiter, more middle class family-the English-speaking family with a
higher socioeconomic status-in whose care N.S. would become Whiter than
she might with her LEP, working poor, single grandmother supporting seven
children. The assimilationist force of the child welfare system thus drove the
case in the agency and lower court, despite Nevada's clear policy to place
children with kin.
Id.
294 SeeAppell, supra note 126, at 765;Julian et al., supra note 126, at 31.
295 SeeAppell, supra note 128, at 765;Julian et al., supra note 126, at 31.
296 Rabin, supra note 10, at 137-38 ("[N] early all of the twenty-six CPS workers who re-
sponded [to a survey] thought the undocumented parents would be more likely to have
problems with domestic violence, and roughly one quarter thought they would be more like-
ly to have problems with child neglect, abandonment, substance abuse, and mental health.
These figures suggest that a significant number of caseworkers assume negative characteris-
tics of immigrant families in the absence of any individualized basis for the assumption.").
297 Appell, supra note 126, at 762. This same criticism is often directed at immigrant
families. See id. at 762-63.
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method for saving the Indian people was to separate children from
their parents and tribes. 298 These reformers considered separation to
be in a child's best interest because it would protect them from the
damaging influences of their parents and provide them with the so-
called benefits of civilization.299 They believed that once removed from
the harmful influences of their families, Indian children would be able
to avoid the poverty and other negative consequences that increasingly
characterized tribal life.300
The initial separations of Indian children from their families typi-
cally involved placement in boarding schools.3 01 By the 1950s, the fed-
eral government finally acknowledged that removal to these schools
harmed Indian children.s0 2 Nevertheless, the belief that removal was in
the best interests of Indian children continued.303 The Indian Adoption
Project, a joint effort between the Bureau of Indian Affairs and the
Child Welfare League, replaced the boarding schoolS. 3 0 4 The purpose
of this program was to facilitate the adoption of Indian children by
non-Indian families, something both organizations advocated as in the
children's best interests. 30
Congress finally curtailed the practice of separating Indian chil-
dren from their families in 1978 with the passage of the Indian Child
Welfare Act.306 The Act recognized the devastation that such removals
were having on the tribes and also recognized the legitimacy and value
of Indian families and their care-giving practices.307 Scholars and other
298 See id. at 762.
299See Zug, supra note 267, at 774. Such reformers believed that as long as Indian chil-
dren were "'associating all their highest ideals of manhood and womanhood with fathers
who are degraded and mothers who are debased,'" they would never become healthy, pro-
ductive members of society. Id. (quoting LindaJ. Lacey, The White Man's Law and the Ameri-
can Indian Family in the Assimilation Era, 40 ARK. L. REv. 327, 360 (1986)).
3oo See Zug, supra note 267, at 774-76. For example, Nineteenth century Indian fami-
lies met public condemnation for allowing women to work, for sharing parenting duties
among extended family members, and for their resistance to corporal punishment. See id.
at 770-74.
30 Id. at 775.
302 See id. at 776-77.
sos See id. at 777.
"0 See id. at 777 n.221.
305 See Zug, supra note 267, at 777. The project was also strongly supported by child wel-
fare workers who, during the 1960s and '70s, "removed 25% to 35% of Indian children
from their homes to foster and adoptive homes. . . ." Appell, supra note 126, at 762.
3 See generally Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-608, 92 Stat. 3069
(codified at 25 U.S.C. §§ 1901-1963 (2006)).
-7 See id. § 2, 25 U.S.C. § 1901. For example, Congress recognized that the value of In-
dian kinship care arrangements is common in Indian families which social workers had pre-
viously viewed as neglectful. See Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on
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child advocates in modern times are sharply critical of these former
Indian policies.308 What was once considered a bad parent is now ac-
knowledged to simply be a different parent.30 9
C. Best Interests and Nineteenth Century Immigrant Children
A second historic example is even more reminiscent of the removal
practices modern courts and child welfare agencies are employing with
respect to immigrant children. In the nineteenth century, thousands of
children were placed on "orphan trains" and sent to the homes of fami-
lies in the West and Midwest.3 10 Despite the label orphan, many of these
children were not orphans.31' 'They were, instead, mostly children of
Catholic recent immigrants, sent away by wealthy, Protestant 'child sav-
ers."'3 12 These reformers considered the existence of the children's par-
ents irrelevant because, according to the child savers, the parents were
undesirable.313 The child savers believed their actions were in the chil-
dren's best interests. 314 At the time, their actions seemed acts "of nearly
unassailable wisdom and compassion."3 15 Over time, however, these
"savers" have come to be regarded as "cruelly indifferent to the very
children [they] had been designed to help."3 16
Indian Affairs and Public Lands of the H. Comm. on Interior and Insular Affairs, 95th Cong. 96-42,
at 69 (1978) (statement of LeRoy Wilder, Associate Attorney); H.R. REP. No. 95-1386, at 2
(1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 7530, 7531.
s08 See, e.g., Barbara Atwood, The Voice of the Indian Child: Strengthening the Indian Child
Welfare Act Through Children's Participation, 50 ARIz. L. REV. 127, 133 (2008) (describing
policies from boarding schools to the Indian Adoption Project as "misguided paternalism,
ethnocentrism and outright racism").
se9 See Zug, supra note 267, at 770.
s10 SeeO'CONNOR, supra note 267, at 202. By 1929 when the last orphan train departed,
approximately 250,000 children had been sent west. Id. at xvii.
311 Id. at 98-99 ("Victorian families used orphanages as places to park their children
during family crises. A substantial portion of children in orphanages were there only for a
year or two . . . ."); see also id. at 107 (describing how children were placed on orphan trains
without inquiry into the claims of orphanhood).
s12 GUGGENHEIM, supra note 34, at 182; see Appell, supra note 126, at 763 (stating that
these "'saved' children were primarily from immigrant, Catholic working class and poor
families headed by single mothers").
s1s See LINDA GORDON, THE GREAT ARIZONA ORPHAN ABDUcTION 10-11 (1999). "Chil-
dren who appeared to child savers as uncared-for strays were often contributing to their
families' incomes by begging, peddling, gathering castoffs for use or resale, selling their
services, or stealing." Id. The Catholic Charities did not make such severe moral judgments
and instead tried to help the families rather than blaming single mothers or treating them
as "fallen." See id. at 15.
3 See Appell, supra note 126, at 763-64.
s15 O'CONNOR, supra note 267, at xix.
816 Id.
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D. The Disproportionality Movement
As the above examples demonstrate, the removal of minority chil-
dren from their homes is not unprecedented. It has happened in the
past and is continuing in the present.
A modern movement, termed the disproportionality movement,
has raised concerns of bias in the context of African-American parent
termination cases.3 17 The disproportionality movement arose as a reac-
tion to the growing emphasis on children's rights.3 18 It posits that one
of the consequences of the "systemic biases in child welfare system deci-
sion-making" is that children are being removed from their families
unnecessarily.3 19 In particular, the movement focuses on the dispropor-
tionate number of African-American children in foster care as com-
pared to their percentage of the general population.3 20 The move-
ment's proponents argue that this "disproportionality" demonstrates a
bias in removal decisions. 321
Many studies have demonstrated how bias can and does affect de-
cision-making. 322 Child welfare decisions by their nature are highly sub-
jective and therefore can provide an easy avenue for expressing bias.323
317 See Bartholet, supra note 14, at 871. Professor Bartholet appears to have been the
first to refer to disproportionality arguments as representing a movement. Id.
318 See GUGGENHEIM, supra note 34, at 5-6; Bartholet, supra note 14, at 871. Professor
Guggenheim argues it
is not coincidental that the call for the permanent banishment of birth par-
ents reached its zenith when the foster care population reached an unprece-
dented high of being nonwhite. As a result of this major policy change [seek-
ing to terminate parents], an official goal of U.S. policy today is to socially
engineer the makeup of the families raising poor, nonwhite children.
Id. at 205. Guggenheim notes that "of the 42,000 children in [New York City] foster care in
December 1997, only 3.1 percent were categorized as 'non-Hispanic white.'" Id. This "means
that, somehow or other, New York City has found a way to maintain a child welfare system for
its white population that treats placement in foster care as an extremely rare event." Id.
319 See Bartholet, supra note 14, at 873, 878-79.
320 Id. at 871.
s21 Jessica Dixon, The Affican-American Child Welfare Act: A Legal Redress for African-
American Disproportionality in Child Protection Cases, 10 BERKELEYJ. AFR.-Am. L. & POL'Y 109,
112 (2008). The purpose of the disproportionality movement is to focus attention on the
problem of racism in the child welfare system. See id. But see Bartholet, supra note 14, at 905
(arguing that such bias may be less likely in the child welfare system because of the high
number of black and other minority social workers).
-22 See, e.g., Christine Jolls & Cass R. Sunstein, The Law of Implicit Bias, 94 CAL. L. REv.
969, 975 n.31 (2006) (noting "[t]he legal literature on implicit bias is by now enormous");
Jerry Kang, Trojan Horses of Race, 118 HARV. L. REv. 1489, 1512-14 (2005) (describing stud-
ies revealing implicit bias); Charles R. Lawrence III, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection:
Reckoning with Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REv. 317, 322-23 (1987).
323 See GORDON, supra note 313, at 10-11; Appel, supra note 126, at 764-65.
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Consequently, the movement's adherents argue that biased beliefs re-
garding the inferiority of African-American families and their care-
giving cause child welfare workers to disproportionally and unnecessar-
ily remove African-American children from their parents. 3 24 Welfare
workers perceive these removals to be in the children's best interests
because they believe they are removing children from "bad" parents
and making them available for adoption by "good" parents. 3 25 Scholars
such as Michelle Goodwin have noted, however, that adoption-at least
in the African-American context-is not the panacea imagined. 26 In-
stead, many of these children will spend the remainder of their child-
hoods in foster care, the negative effects of which are numerous and
well documented. 327 Therefore, although the increase in removals was
324 Bartholet, supra note 14, at 873. In the context of African-American families, such bi-
ases frequently pertain to beliefs that African-American parents are more likely to take drugs
and physically abuse their children than their white counterparts. See, e.g., Peggy C. Davis &
Richard G. Dudley, Jr., The Black Family in Modern Slavery, 4 HARVARD BLACKLETTER J. 9, 10-
15 (1987); Dixon, supra note 321, at 117-18 (discussing studies demonstrating that African-
American children were more likely to have skeletal surveys done to check for fractures and
more likely to be tested for drugs); Annette R. Appell, Disposable Mothers, Deployable Children, 9
MIcH.J. RACE & L. 421, 442 (2004) (reviewing RANDALL KENNEDY, INTERRACIAL INTIMACIES:
SEX, MARRIAGE, IDENTITY, AND ADOPTION (2003)) (noting "empirical evidence indicates that
child welfare professionals view Black families as less viable, less resourceful, and, conse-
quently, in need of coercive state intervention"). See generally DOROTHY ROBERTS, SHATTERED
BONDs: THE COLOR OF CHILD WELFARE 7-10 (2002) (describing the disproportionate num-
ber ofAfrican-American children in the child welfare system).
325 See Appel, supra note 126, at 765. As scholars such as Professor Martin Guggenheim
have noted, a court's use of the best interest test is often influenced by its own value judg-
ments. See, e.g., Painter v. Bannister, 140 N.W.2d 152, 156 (Iowa 1966) (denying custody to
fit father based on "unstable, unconventional, arty, Bohemian" lifestyle); GUGGENHEIM,
supra note 34, at 39-40.
326 See Michele Goodwin, Relational Markets in Intimate Goods, 44 TULSA L. REv. 803, 821
(2009). For a discussion of the illusory nature of adoption, see id. at 821 n.133 ("As a con-
temporary model, the disproportionately low adoption rate for black children in foster
care gives some indication of the continued illusory nature of adoption as a specialized
child-focused welfare service model.") (citing Richard P. Barth, Effects of Age and Race on the
Odds of Adoption Versus Remaining in Long-TerN Out-of-Home Care, 76 CHILD WELFARE 285,
288 (1997) (noting the adoption rates of white children in the Michigan foster care system
are three times greater than black children)); Jane C. Murphy, Protecting Children by Preserv-
ing Parenthood, 14 Wm. & MARY BILL RTs. J. 969, 982 (2006) (noting that "children left
behind in permanent foster care status are disproportionately African American and, as
they age, are practically unadoptable"); see also Caring for Children: Who Will Adopt the Foster
Care Children Left Behind?, URB. INST., (June, 2003), http://www.urban.org/UploadedPDF/
310809_caringforchildren_2.pdf ("Compared with children still in foster care, those who
are adopted are younger and more likely to be female, Caucasian, and Hispanic ....
[T] hose awaiting adoption tend to be ... older, male, and black.. .").
327 See Murphy, supra note 326, at 982.
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spurred by the desire to help children, these removals may be working
against their best interests. 328
E. Good Parents vs. Inmigrant Parents
The separation of immigrant parents from their children seems to
be based on similar assumptions regarding good parents and the belief
that children have the right to be raised by good parents. 329 Obviously
the definition of a good parent is subjective.330 Typically, a good parent
is defined in relation to dominant cultural norms.s 1 According to Pro-
fessor Annette Appell, this means "married; White; Christian (prefera-
bly Protestant); Anglo; and relatedly, English-speaking; and middle
class."33 2 Defining a good parent in relation to these norms can be par-
ticularly problematic for immigrant parents because these norms may
differ significantly from the norms present in their country of origin.333
For example, American norms hold that families should be independ-
ent and not too reliant on extended family or community members. 334
As Professor Naomi Cahn has noted, this means that parents, and par-
ticularly mothers, are expected "to be primarily responsible for their
children."33 6 Consequently, although sharing child care responsibilities
among extended family is common throughout much of the world,
parents living in the United States who delegate that responsibility to
others, such as a grandparent or an older child may be considered bad
parents. 336
328 Id.
329See Goel, supra note 279, at 526-527.
330 See id. at 526 (describing how, "[b] ecause of their own bias against the culture and way
of life in China, the [foster parents] felt the need to rescue Anna Mae from a life there").
s3 See id.
332 Appell, supra note 126, at 765; see also Elizabeth M. Iglesias, Rape, Race, and Represen-
tation: The Power of Discourse, Discourses of Power and the Reconstruction of Heterosexuality, 49
VAND. L. REv. 869, 904-05 (1996) (describing how the image of motherhood in black and
Hispanic cultures is different from the dominant norm and, as a result, these families are
viewed "as failed versions of the white, male-headed nuclear family").
3 See Appell, supra note 126, at 765.
4 See id. This is especially problematic for immigrant parents who often come from so-
cieties where it is common for children to be raised by grandparents and where older siblings
are frequently made responsible for their younger siblings' care. See Solangel Maldonado,
The Role of Race, Ethnicity and Culture in Custody Disputes 14 (unpublished manuscript)
(on file with the author) (noting that "in Asia and Latin-America, older children are rou-
tinely given significant responsibilities for their younger siblings' care").
3 See Naomi Cahn, Policing Women: Moral Arguments and the Dilemmas of Criminalization,
49 DEPAUL L. REv. 817, 822 (2000).
336 See Maldonado, supra note 334, at 14.
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Similarly, living arrangements that are common throughout the
world, such as two families sharing a home or three people sharing a
bedroom, can be viewed with suspicion when practiced in the United
States. 337 Accommodations that do not afford children the level of pri-
vacy typical in American families are treated with concern by American
courts and child welfare agencies. 338 In addition, educational deficien-
cies or medical conditions that are often left untreated in countries
with more limited resources will be viewed with serious concern by U.S.
courts and agencies. 339 What was a rational decision in a parent's home
country may be considered unjustified by American institutions. 3 4o
These examples illustrate how courts and welfare agencies that evaluate
immigrant parents in relation to white, middle class, English-speaking
norms may be more likely to judge parents unfit.341
Although divergence from these norms creates difficulties for
many minority parents, it is particularly problematic for immigrant
parents.3 42 In most cases, explicit bias against minority groups is con-
3" Id. at 14 (citing Rico v. Rodriguez, 120 P.3d 812 (Nev. 2005)).
338 Id. at 14-15.
33 Id. at 15.
340 See Goel, supra note 279, at 527 (noting that the guardian ad litem's best interest
determination was influenced by the fact that "she had read a book about Chinese girls
being placed in orphanages and consequently was concerned that the parents wanted to
return to China . . .).
34 See Appell, supra note 126, at 770. The perceived unfitness of parents who do not
speak English is demonstrated by the lack of child welfare officials that speak other lan-
guages. See id. The result is that only English-speaking parents are able to receive meaning-
ful assistance. See id. (describing the child welfare system in Las Vegas and noting the "rar-
ity of Spanish-speaking (and other foreign language speaking) case workers, a dearth of
translators on staff in child welfare offices, and perhaps an absence of Spanish-speaking
teams of social workers in the child welfare system despite [its] geographical concentra-
tions of Latino communities"); see also Julian et al., supra note 126, at 31 (observing that
the "parenting styles of Caucasian, middle-class parents are then used as the benchmark
against which other groups are compared, with an assumption of Caucasian superiority").
It should be noted that these assumptions are not only relevant in termination cases but
are frequently applied in custody disputes between biological parents. See, e.g., Rico, 120
P.3d at 818-19 (giving custody preference to the permanent resident father over the un-
documented immigrant mother); Ramirez v. Ramirez, Nos. 2005-CA-002554-ME, 2006-CA-
000010-ME, 2007 WL 1192587, at *3 (Ky. Ct. App. Apr. 13, 2007) (finding that the deter-
mination of a father's immigration status was appropriate in a custody hearing).
342 SeeAppell, supra note 126, at 765. Bias against undocumented immigrants tends to fo-
cus on Hispanic immigrants because they comprise the majority of the undocumented im-
migrant population. See id. at 768; Julian et al., supra note 126, at 31. According to the Urban
Institute, "Mexicans make up over half of undocumented immigrants-5 7 percent of the
total, or about 5.3 million. Another 2.2 million (23 percent) are from other Latin American
countries. About 10 percent are from Asia, 5 percent from Europe and Canada, and 5 per-
cent from the rest of the world." Jeffrey S. Passel et al., Undocumented Immigrants: Facts and
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demned. 43 Bias against immigrants and undocumented immigrants in
particular, however, is widely viewed as acceptable. 3" Such discrimina-
tion is not only tolerated, it is frequently encouraged.345 Politicians are
Figures, URBAN INsTrrUTE IMMIGRATION STUDIES PROGRAM (Jan. 12, 2004), http://www.
urban.org/UploadedPDF/1000587 undoc immigrantsjfacts.pdf.
s See Ralph Richard Banks & Richard Thompson Ford, (How) Does Unconscious Bias
Matter?: Law, Politics, and Racial Inequality, 58 EMORY L.J. 1053, 1054 (2009). Even individu-
als who harbor personal feelings of bias toward minorities recognize society's disapproval
of such feelings and are increasingly unwilling to acknowledge that their actions are the
result of biased beliefs and assumptions. See id. (noting that the "invocation of unconscious
bias levels neither accusation nor blame, so much as it identifies a quasi-medical ailment
that distorts thinking and behavior"). As Professors Banks and Ford note, "[pleople may
be willing to acknowledge the possibility of unconscious bias within themselves, even as
they would vigorously deny harboring conscious bias." Id.
34 See David B. Thronson, Of Borders and Best Interests: Examining the Experiences of Un-
documented Immigrants in U.S. Family Courts, 11 Tx. Hisp. J.L. & POL'Y 45, 54-55 (2005)
(noting the "pervasive societal narrative that constructs an expanding notion of unworthi-
ness and 'illegality' regarding undocumented immigrants and a diminished popular sense
regarding the availability of protection from prejudice and discrimination"); see also Shell
Games: The "Minutemen" and Vigilante Anti-Immigrant Politics, BUILDING DEMOCRACY INITIA-
TIVE: CENTER FOR NEW COMMUNrry (Oct. 2005), http://www.buildingdemocracy.org/
shellgames.pdf [hereinafter The Minutemen] (noting that with regard to immigrants, the
gains of the civil rights movement "are under attack"). "[Ainti-immigrant sentiment is
sweeping the country like wildfire. Stoked by political successes in and out of the Beltway
and fanned by anti-immigrant organizations, nativism has moved from the margins to the
mainstream." The Minutemen, supra.
4 See Thronson, supra note 344, at 55. Even the terminology used to describe un-
documented persons is loaded with implications. Throughout this article, I have used the
term undocumented immigrant rather than illegal alien. As Dean Kevin Johnson has
noted the word "alien" has incredible power:
[It] immediately brings forth rich imagery. One thinks of space invaders seen
on television and in movies, such as the blockbuster movie Independence Day.
Popular culture reinforces the idea that aliens may be killed with impunity
and, if not, "they" will destroy the world as we know it. Synonyms for alien
have included "stranger, intruder, interloper, ... outsider, [and] barbarian,"
all terms that suggest the need for harsh treatment and self-preservation. In
effect, the term alien serves to dehumanize persons. We have few, if any, legal
obligations to alien outsiders to the community, though we have obligations
to persons. Persons have rights while aliens do not.
Kevin R. Johnson, "Aliens" and the U.S. Immigration Laws: The Social and Legal Construction of
Nonpersons, 28 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 263, 272 (1997) (internal citations omitted).
"[Eighty-seven] members of the House of Representatives and one member of the Senate
received an 'A' grade in the 110th Congress from the hard-line anti-immigrant organization
Federation for American Immigration Reform ... , labeled a hate group by the Southern
Poverty L-aw Center." Press Release, Am. Voice, Anti-Immigrant Members of Congress Hypo-
critical on Worker Prot. Issues (Dec 10, 2009), available at http://americasvoiceonline.org/
pressjreleases/entry/anti-immigrant members ofcongresshypocritical on worker-pro-
tectionissues; see, e.g., Jeannie Kever, Toy Drives Insist They Reject No One: Pair of Houston Chari-
ties Require Registrants to Show Immigration Status, HOUSTON CHRON., Dec. 2, 2009, at Bl. (de-
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elected because of their anti-immigrant rhetoric, pro-immigrant busi-
nesses are boycotted, and anti-immigrant vigilantes are treated as he-
roes.34 6 Consequently, the difficulty for undocumented immigrant par-
ents facing a fitness determination is not only that they often lack many
of the culturally biased attributes of good parents, but that they may
also be subject to the proliferating negative views of undocumented
immigrants.347 Additionally, because the language, culture, and values
associated with undocumented immigrants are openly considered un-
desirable, many may believe that preventing parents from passing these
attributes to their children are in the children's best interests. 348 Courts
and child welfare agencies routinely express concerns regarding the
scribing a Toys for Tots program's requirement of a valid social security number to receive
toys).
346 See, e.g. Suzy Khimm, Run For The Border Steve King's Coming!, MOTHER JONES, (Nov.
10, 2010, 3:00 AM PST), http://motherjones.com/politics/2010/11/steve-king-inmig-
ration-committee (describing two of the most anti-immigrant congressmen); Working to
Stop Illegal Immigration, NAT'L ILLEGAL IMMIGR. BoycoTT COALITION, http://www.illegal
inmigrationboycott.com/ (last visited Nov. 20, 2011). For example, The National Illegal
Immigrant Boycott Coalition is a political action group created solely for the purpose of
boycotting "corporations that support illegal immigration." See Americans Working to Stop
Illegal Immigration, supra; see also The Minutemen, supra note 344 (describing the "Minute-
men Project" which consists of "armed anti-immigrant vigilantes conducting their own
patrols'") The report notes:
After their highly publicized "maneuvers" in April in Arizona, the Minutemen
Project has spawned at least forty new groups in more than a dozen states. In
October, Minutemen groups are preparing events in several new states. At-
tracting volunteers and well-wishers from all over the country, the Minutemen
are the latest and largest in a string of vigilante efforts to "secure" the border
against the entry of undocumented immigrants.
See The Minutemen, supra note 344.
3 See Appell, supra note 126, at 759; Johnson, supra note 345, at 272. "[W]e have in
this country a long and continuing history of constructing the ideal of 'mother' according
to skin color, religion, culture, national origin, language, ethnicity, class and marital
status." Appell, supra note 126, at 759. Mothers who do not meet these norms are most
likely to lose their motherhood. See id.
348 See Appell, supra note 126, at 760 ("Women who are compliant, English-speaking,
not ethnically diverse, White, and middle class are most successful in the child welfare
system; those who diverge from these norms are [the] most likely to lose their mother-
hood. When mothers lose their children, they lose their chance to pass on their language,
culture, and values [to] their children."); see also Santosky 455 U.S. at 763 (noting that "par-
ents subject to termination proceedings are often poor, uneducated, or members of mi-
nority groups, such proceedings are often vulnerable to judgments based on cultural or
class bias") (internal citations omitted); David B. Thronson, Choiceless Choices: Deportation
and the Parent-Child Relationship, 6 NEv. L.J. 1165, 1204 (2000) (noting that "family courts
can be remarkably parochial and uninformed regarding issues of, and related to, immigra-
tion status and life in other countries").
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language, values, and lifestyle of undocumented immigrants in immi-
grant parent termination cases.349
Given the dangers of best interest analyses, any reliance on them
to remove immigrant children from parents should raise concerns.350
Before a best interest standard, and its attendant weaknesses, is permit-
ted to replace the fitness standard, there must be a clear statement that
this is an intended and desired change.35' Replacing parental rights
with a best interest test is an important reversal that must not occur
unnoticed and unconsidered.
VI. PUBLIC SENTIMENT
History has demonstrated that determining a child's best interest
is subjective and can be susceptible to bias. 3 5 2 Thus, even if the decision
to place a child's best interest above parental rights is good in theory,
its actual implications are unclear. What is clear, however, is that until
there is widespread recognition of the fact that a best interest analysis is
being used to justify removals and terminations within undocumented
families, there can be no meaningful evaluation of the benefits or det-
riments of continuing such actions.
Support for these terminations cannot be assumed. The public
reaction to some of the more publicized terminations creates doubt as
to whether they are publicly supported.353 For example, when Bathezar-
34 See Santosky, 455 U.S. at 763.
350 See id. at 760; see also Zug, supra note 15, at 1181-82.
351 See Zug, supra note 15, at 1181-82. For example, the removal of immigrant children
may result in long-term foster care rather than adoption. See, e.g., Tracy Vericker et al.,
Latino Children of Immigrants in the Texas Child Welfare System, 22 PROTECTING CHILD., 20, no.
2, 2007 at 29-31 (finding that Latino Immigrant Children were more likely to be placed in
group homes and institutes and have case goals such as long term family foster care and
independent living). But see Maldonado, supra note 81, at 1423 (noting that while most
Americans "prefer to adopt white children, many are willing to accept Asian or Latin
American children if they cannot adopt a white child or the wait is too long"). In fact,
"81% of all foreign-born adoptees in the United States[] come from Asia or Latin America
... ." Id. at 1432. Foreign adoptions, however, are difficult: in some instances, "Americans
have completed an adoption in the foreign country only to learn that the child will not be
allowed entry into the United States because he or she does not satisfy the definition of an
'orphan' under our immigration laws." Id. at 1445-46. The adoption of Hispanic immi-
grant children therefore has two "advantages" that may make them more desirable as po-
tential adoptees. See id. at 1425, 1442. First, they are not black, and second, there is little
likelihood of the parent reappearing in the child's life at a later date. See id.
352 See Appell, supra note 126, at 759.
s5s See Shelia Byrd, Mexican Immigrant Gets Baby Back from State, NATIVE AM. TIMES (Feb.
22, 2010), available at http://www.nativetimes.com/news/international/3134-mexican-immi-
grant- gets-baby-back-from-state.
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Cruz lost custody of her daughter due to her lack of English profi-
ciency, the public loudly disapproved of the state's actions.354 This reac-
tion led not only to the return of Bathezar-Cruz's daughter, it also re-
sulted in a potentially significant policy change.35 5 After the baby's
return, Mexico and the State of Mississippi entered into a Memoran-
dum of Understanding.35 6 Under the agreement, any time the Missis-
sippi Child Welfare Services takes a Mexican minor into custody, it
agrees to notify the Mexican consulate, consider relative placement-
including placement in Mexico, request foreign home studies, and "as-
sist Mexican nationals with obtaining permission to cross the border for
court hearings and related re-unification activities."35 7
On the other hand, in the case of Anna Mae He, which concerned
a young girl caught in a custody battle between her American foster
parents and Chinese biological parents, there was significant public
support for the judge's decision to keep her with her foster family.3 58
Although some objected to the decision, others commended the judge
for standing up to 'the liberals' to ensure the best interests of the
child."369
Also telling is proposed national legislation, such as The Humane
Enforcement and Legal Protections for Separated Children Act ("the
HELP Act") and The Immigration and Oversight Fairness Act of
2009.360 Congress proposed the HELP Act to enable detained, deport-
able parents to maintain contact with their children in the United
States. 36' The HELP Act would provide nationwide protocols to help
34 See Goel, supra note 279, at 528; Byrd, supra note 353.
3 See Byrd, supra note 353.
56 See id.
37 See Byrd, supra note 358; DEP'T OF HUMAN SERVS. Div. OF FAMILY & CHILDREN'S
SERVS., STATE OF Miss., ANNUAL PROGRESS AND SERVICES REPORT 49 (2011), available at
http://www.mdhs.state.ms.us/pdfs/fcs-apsr20lO.pdf. Other states have entered into sini-
lar agreements. See, e.g., Memorandum from Erwin McEwen, to Rules & Procedures Book-
holders & Child Protective & Child Welfare Staff (May 16, 2008), available at http://www.
state.il.us/DCFS/docs/policyGuides/PolicyGuide_2008.02.pdf.
38 See Goel, supra note 279, at 528 (discussing the public reaction to the He decision).
s59 Id.
s6o See Press Release, First Focus Campaign for Children, Senate Legislation Protects
Children and Families Impacted by Immigration Enforcement (June 22, 2010), available at
http://www.ffcampaignforchildren.org/news/press-releases/senate-legislation-protects-chil-
dren-and-families-impacted-by-immigration-enforc (hereinafter Press Release, Campaign
for Children); Press Release, First Focus, Woolsey, Roybal-Allard Discuss Legislation to
Mitigate the Impact of Immigration Policy on Children (Nov. 5, 2009), available at http://
www.firstfocus.net/news/press-release/woolsey-roybal-allard-discuss-legislation-mitigate-im-
pact-immigration-policy-chil (hereinafter Press Release, Woolsey).
361 See Press Release, Campaign for Children, supra note 360.
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keep children with their parents while the parents' cases are pending.362
It recognizes the difficulties faced by detained and deported parents.
Furthermore, it would ensure regular communication between parents
and their children, and help detained individuals live with their families
while their cases are pending.363 Similarly, the proposed Comprehensive
Immigration Reform for America's Security and Prosperity Act of 2009
would permit immigration judges to prevent the deportation of a parent
of a U.S. citizen child if removal is not in the child's best interest.3 6 4
These pieces of legislation demonstrate support for immigrant
family reunification.3 65 The proposed bills encourage immigrant family
reunification and appear to be at odds with the trend toward increasing
the separation of immigrant families.366 At the same time, the lack of
traction of these measures in Congress casts doubt on the public's
commitment to stopping immigrant family separations.367 It is impossi-
ble to discern a clear policy or even attempt to accurately gauge public
sentiment on the issue of immigrant family separations. 368 It might be
that the majority of Americans would object to such parental termina-
tion cases. Without more attention given to this issue or a clear policy
statement against such removals, however, it is likely that the removal of
children from their undocumented parents will continue to take place.
362 See id.
363 Press Release, Woolsey, supra note 360.
3 See H.R. 4321, 111th Cong. §§ 1, 187 (2009); Comprehensive Immigration Reform ASAP,
NYS IMMIGRANT AcTIoN FUND, http://nysiaf.org/legislation/comprehensive-immigraiont-
reform-asap (last visited Nov. 21, 2011).
365 See Press Release, Campaign for Children, supra note 360; Press Release, Woolsey,
supra note 360; Comprehensive Immigrant Reform ASAP, supra note 364.
366 See Press Release, Campaign for Children, supra note 360; Press Release, Woolsey, su-
pra note 360; Comprehensive Immigrant Reform ASAP, supra note 364. A similar piece of pro-
posed legislation is the Immigration and Oversight Fairness Act of 2009, which would provide
better treatment to detainees. See Press Release, Congresswoman Lucille Roybal-Allard, Con-
gresswoman Roybal-Allard (CA-34) Introduces Legislation to Ensure the Humane Treatment
of Immigration Detainees (Feb. 26, 2009), available at http://roybal-allard.house.gov/News/
DocumentSingle.aspx?DocumentlD=126158. This bill would establish legally enforceable
detention standards but also increase the use of alternatives to detention for individuals such
as pregnant women, asylum seekers and families with children. See id. These individuals
would be placed in programs of supervised release rather than detention. See id. For families
with children, this would prevent initial separation in many cases as well as create the possibil-
ity of reunification in situations where the children have been removed. See id.
367 See, e.g., HELP Separated Children Act, H.R. 2607, 112th Cong. (2011); H.R. 4321.
68 See Tara Bahrampour, More Laws are Enacted to Help, Not Restrict, Illegal Immigrants,
WASH. POST, May 11, 2010. This is perhaps not surprising given that U.S. Immigration
policy in general is mixed. See id. The Arizona immigration laws demonstrate one extreme;
a study by the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, however, reveals that
more laws are passed nationwide that expand immigrant rights than contract them. See id.
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CONCLUSION
The decades-long struggle between children's and parents' rights
is continuing. The ascendancy of children's rights has had far reaching
effects and the termination of undocumented immigrant parents'
rights is one of the most recent but least noticed. Best interest consid-
erations may justify these terminations. Permitting such considerations
to support the termination of fit parents' rights, however, represents a
substantial law and policy change. This change must be recognized and
its implications considered before it is permitted to continue.
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